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ABSTRACT

Mentality and Fundamentality
By
Christopher Devlin Brown

Advisor: David Papineau
Extant well-considered problems with physicalism primarily come from two sources: philosophers of mind
arguing that subjective experience does not fit into a physicalist world-picture, and metaphysicians trying
to figure out the particular commitments of the view. I examine the thesis of physicalism in order to
produce a clearer notion of the physical and to help straighten out physicalism’s entailments, while
simultaneously providing a strategy for physicalists to sidestep well known anti-physicalist arguments
concerning consciousness. This involves both a critical and a positive effort: on the critical side, I expose
an issue with a popular way of understanding physicalism called “via negativa” physicalism, which is the
view that ‘physical’ should be understood to mean ‘not fundamentally mental’. The positive project has
two components. One part defends physicalism from the ever-looming threat of the scientific insolubility of
phenomenal consciousness by fleshing out a version of Russellian monism called “Russellian
physicalism”, which is the view that the structural/dispositional properties described by fundamental
physics have inscrutable role-fillers that are not directly revealed through scientific inquiry. The other part
of the positive project consists in examining the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism, which
are the consequences that have a bearing on whether we ought to continue to live. Toward this end, I
determine whether such things as robust free will, God, ultimate purpose and an immortal soul are
consistent with the most popular versions of physicalism.
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I. Introduction

1. Summary
Physicalism—roughly, the view that there is nothing over and above the physical—has nearly achieved
the status of orthodoxy in analytic philosophy, serving as a backdrop against which diverse topics such as
the nature of representational content (Fodor 1990), free will (Pereboom 2014) and the self (Parfit 1984)
are discussed. In philosophy of mind, arguments concerning physicalism have occupied a central role
following Jackson’s (1982) articulation of the knowledge argument and Chalmers’ (1996) articulation of
the conceivability argument, both of which conclude that physicalism cannot accommodate the existence
of subjective experience. However, despite the massive importance of physicalism across the field, there
is no consensus on what the view specifically means. For instance, some think physicalism has to do with
the dependence of all things on the entities and properties described by physics, while others think this
physics-based approach is a dead end, and instead urge that physicalism has more to do with the sort of
mentality that exists (or doesn’t exist) in an entirely physical world.
My primary goal in this dissertation is to work toward the proper articulation of physicalism, and
figure out what its consequences are. I start by critiquing a way of understanding physicalism called “via
negativa physicalism”, which says that physicalism is true if everything ultimately depends on things that
are not mental. Under this view, fundamental mentality of any sort renders physicalism false. I argue that
via negativa wrongly rules that physicalism is false in various classes of possible worlds in which
physicalism plausibly ought to be true. These are worlds with either an infinite descent of physicallyacceptable mentality in an infinitely decomposable world, or physically-acceptable mentality at the level of
the whole cosmos in a priority monist world.
The general idea behind via negativa physicalism is right—nearly everyone agrees that the
existence of certain sorts of mentality is sufficient to make physicalism false. The problem is that via
negativa as typically articulated does not offer a nuanced enough distinction between physically
acceptable versus physically unacceptable mentality. Thus, my criticism ought to motivate via negativa
physicalists to find a more acceptable account of the physical, and specifically one which distinguishes
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between physically acceptable mentality and physically unacceptable mentality in a more sophisticated
way than via a simple appeal to fundamental mentality.
The third section of the dissertation considers physicalism as an existential condition, which I
define as a condition that has a bearing on whether we ought to continue to live or not. Upon inspection, it
turns out that different versions of physicalism have different existential consequences. For example, any
plausible theory-based definition is consistent with the existence of an ultimate purpose for the universe
or individual humans, but the via negativa definition is inconsistent with the existence of ultimate purpose.
I will show that via negativa physicalism is the existentially more radical sort of physicalism—terrifying for
those in need of some metaphysical reassurance that humanity is somehow metaphysically special, and
emboldening to those who think humanity ought to cast off the superstitious myths of the past.
The final section defends a version of physicalism called “Russellian physicalism” as the best
answer to the mind-body problem. This is the view that there are scientifically inscrutable, categorical
realizers for the structural and dispositional properties described by physics. These categorical realizers
form the dependence base for higher-level inscrutable, categorical properties, amongst which are the
properties that constitute subjective experience. This view provides satisfying answers to all the typical
antiphysicalist challenges offered by nonphysicalists, and these answers do not require making the
fundamental categorical properties essentially mental or tied to mentality in a problematic way.
It turns out that this Russellian physicalism is consistent with via negativa physicalism, but not
with theory-based physicalism. This is because the view explains subjective experience without positing
fundamental mental properties, but additionally requires that there be properties outside the purview of
science. Given the attractiveness of Russellian physicalism, it is my view that we need to face the more
extreme existential consequences of via negativa physicalism.
Some of the material in this dissertation is pulled from or closely related to work that I have
published or which is currently under review. Specifically, the first half of section two, which criticizes via
negativa physicalism, is largely from my 2017 Erkenntnis paper, Minds Within Minds: An Infinite Descent
of Mentality in a Physical World. The second half of that section is from a paper that is under review.
Everything in section three, on physicalism as an existential condition, is original to this dissertation. The
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final section, on Russellian physicalism, is from a paper that is under review, and is related to work in my
2017 Journal of Consciousness Studies paper, A Properly Physical Russellian Physicalism.
2. Historical Preliminaries
Before getting any further into the fine details, allow me to first tell a story about how physicalism arose
and came into prominence, as well as the historical relationship between abstract metaphysics generally
and humanity’s various existential concerns. Much of what I say here is just a combination of strands of
thought found in David Papineau’s (2001) The Rise of Physicalism, Jaegwon Kim’s (1998) Mind in a
Physical World, Barbara Montero’s (1999) The Body Problem, and Tim Crane and David Mellor’s (1990)
There Is No Question of Physicalism. However, I do not agree with Crane and Mellor’s conclusion that
physicalism must be an empty doctrine, and have reservations about Papineau’s thesis that twentieth
century scientists acquired sufficient empirical evidence to prove the view—but I am getting ahead of
myself.
Starting at the beginning: Thales, of first-Greek-philosopher fame, argued that everything is
water. So far as I can tell (from the little we know about him, which comes entirely from secondary
sources like Aristotle), he did not think that everything literally is water in the ordinary sense. That would
be absurd. Rather, he was asserting that everything is fundamentally water: that the most basic
constituents of the world are watery. By contemporary standards, the view is silly and drastically
undermotivated, but it nonetheless represents a vital milestone. The significance consists not in the view
itself, but rather in its general structure and the approach that led to it. Thales was positing a novel thesis
about the underlying fundamental nature of reality, and he did not appeal to tradition or divine inspiration
to support his thesis. Rather, his metaphysics was grounded in empirically-based reasons: according to
Aristotle, Thales noticed and tried to explain that all living beings get nourishment from moisture.
Thales, of course, opened the floodgate for a torrent of philosophical theorizing about the
fundamental nature of reality—which I mostly won’t get into here. What is relevant is that these
philosophers took the views they were promulgating to have not just scientific or abstract significance, but
additionally to have a great deal of personal significance. For the ancient Greeks, existential cares were
intimately tied up with their metaphysical visions, often quite explicitly.
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For instance, Plato thought that both individual and collective good depend on realizing an
appropriate relationship to the perfect and eternal forms. Individuals and governments can be ranked into
hierarchies depending on their relationships to the forms, with the bottom being those persons and
societies that are not informed by the forms at all, and the top consisting of Platonic philosophers and
societies run by Platonic philosophers who have intimate knowledge of the forms. Offering a quite
different metaphysical and existential perspective, Epicurus thought that the truth of atomistic materialism
reveals that we do not have immortal souls which can transcend the body after death, and so we need
not fear what would happen to us in an afterlife. Epicurus found existential comfort in the transience of
human existence—nearly an exact inversion of Plato, who deemed highest value to reside in the eternal,
and espoused endless transmigration of the soul from from body to heaven and back again, cycling
eternally, as an enlightened and hopeful doctrine.
Tying existential cares to a metaphysical project continued well past the Greek period. A random
sample: the Stoics believed that the best way to live is in accord with their idea of nature; many Christian
philosophers held that the best life is one in close relationship to the divinity; Hegel thought that human
good is determined by universal consciousness rising to higher levels of self-consciousness; and
Schopenhauer thought that all of our near-inescapable sufferings result from the activity of the will of the
world, which writhes in the dark at the bottom of all things. No deep philosophical exegesis beyond this
cursory surface-level look is necessary to reveal that existential interests have played a large role in the
metaphysical theorizing of many of our most significant philosophers. But what about my principal
subject, the all-too-contemporary thesis called ‘physicalism’?
How physicalism arose and developed will form the basic outline for a picture of its existential
import. Physicalism can be understood as a view that emerged from two related threads of discourse.
One thread is philosophical and scientific discussion concerning the relationship between the mind and
the brain—referred to in philosophical literature as the “mind-body problem”. The other thread consists of
philosophers attempting to articulate the appropriate metaphysics of science. These two threads cross at
several points, and in fact have become quite tangled.
As everyone who has studied any philosophy of mind knows, the contemporary mind-body
problem more-or-less started with Descartes (1641/1996), who posited two sorts of fundamental
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substances: the thinking and feeling mental, and the extended material, which interact via the immaterial
mind’s ability to change the direction of the material components of the brain. The nature of this
interaction, though, is quite mysterious: how can something which is essentially immaterial cause
changes to an extended, material substance? According to Leibniz (1714/1991), Descartes’ answer
rested on an incomplete understanding of physics: his conservation of motion law allows change of
direction of extended bodies so long as the total amount of motion is conserved, such that the mind can
cause bodily behavior by changing the directions of extended things moving in the brain, yet does not
change the total amount of motion in that system.1
The subsequent physics of Newton and Leibniz posited conservation laws that disallow changing
the direction of an object without the addition of energy, and necessitated the need for a new explanation
of the relation between mind and body. Importantly, however, Leibniz’s physics requires contact-based
interaction between objects, whereas Newton posited force fields that allow for non-contact-based
interaction—and notably allow for special mental forces. Thus, Leibniz’s (instantly outdated) physics
elicited epicycles on Cartesian dualism, as in Leibniz's own pre-established harmony and Malebranche’s
occasionalism,

whereas Newtonian physics allows for a uniquely mental force of nature—which

apparently made interactionist mind-body dualism a scientifically respectable option.
However, according to David Papineau (2001), further scientific progress in the twentieth century
and onward has provided evidence against the positing of special mental forces, and thus there seem to
now be good empirical grounds to rule out interactive Cartesian-esque dualism. Since both
epiphenomenalism (which says that the mental is not causally efficacious) and overdetermination (which
says that physical effects are overdetermined by both mental and physical causes) are unpalatable
options, materialism emerged as the apparent best solution to the interaction problem.2 By identifying

1

This is likely due to Descartes thinking of the behavior of material bodies in terms of the scalar concept
of speed rather than the vectorial concept of velocity. The total motion of a system, determined by the
speeds and (for Descartes) sizes of the parts of the system, can remain constant even if parts of the
system change direction. Not so for velocities: change of direction requires a change of velocity. The
given reading of Descartes—that his good-for-the-time but poor-for-now physics grounds his tentative
answer to the interaction problem—is somewhat contentious, and largely based on an interpretation from
Leibniz. However, see Peter McLaughlin (1993) for a defense of this exegesis.
2 Of course, this gloss on the history of the mind-body problem overlooks many major developments in
philosophy of mind and philosophy more generally, perhaps most notably the positivist period that
dominated analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. While metaphysics was explicitly
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mind and matter, it seems that there is no issue with interaction: the material mind can affect other parts
of the material world in roughly the same way that any other material things interact.
Additionally, this view seemed to be the proper metaphysics of science: one might think that our
best science only posits matter and laws governing matter, so any metaphysics positing nonmaterial
entities would exceed our scientific reach. However, materialism as an a priori project of specifying the
nature of the fundamental world turned out to be—contrary to the scientific spirit of materialism—an antiscientific philosophical endeavour. This is because a priori conceptions of matter—concocted from the
armchair rather than from the laboratory—attributed many properties to fundamental entities that our best
physics now denies. For instance, 17th century materialists’ conception of matter was of something “solid,
inert, impenetrable and conserved, and to interact deterministically and only on contact” (Crane and
Mellor 1990, 186). So materialism was a misguided attempt at articulating the proper metaphysics of
science. This does not mean materialism was a complete failure: it birthed an apparently more viable
successor, the view called “physicalism”.
Physicalism attempts to avoid the error of materialism by leaving somewhat open exactly what
the fundamental level of reality is like. Originally, physicalism did this by understanding ‘physical’ solely in
terms of physics: something is fundamental and physical if it is a posit of fundamental physics. Thus,
philosophers thought to leave the task of determining what the fundamental level of reality is precisely like
to the physicists, rather than characterizing reality from the armchair.
However, Hempel (1969) pointed out a devastating ambiguity in this understanding of ‘physical’: if
‘physics’ refers to current physics, then physicalism is trivially false, since we know that current physics is
not complete. If ‘physics’ refers to future or complete physics, then physicalism is either vague to the point
of meaninglessness, since we don’t know what future physics will be like, or trivially true, since a
complete physics is trivially a physics of everything that exists, including paradigmatically nonphysical
things like Cartesian souls and God. This problem has constituted the strongest motivation to find a more
adequate notion of the physical in a definition of physicalism.

anathema for these philosophers, the default position on the nature of the mind was one or another sort
of behaviorism, which might be interpreted as a materialist or materialist-leaning view. I’m not sure how to
perfectly square positivist behaviorism with their apparent commitment to phenomenalist idealism of some
sort, but here I’m not specifically interested in this period in the history of analytic philosophy, so the gloss
seems appropriate.
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Largely independent of this discussion in metaphysics, work progressed in philosophy of mind
toward establishing a theory of the mind that would be consistent with the newly dominant
materialism/physicalism, and which would satisfy an expanding list of various desiderata. Behaviorism—a
view closely tied to anti-metaphysical logical positivism, which says that non-verifiable (and hence
meaningless!) talk about inner mental states cannot be part of the content of a properly scientific theory of
the mind (Hempel 1949, Ryle 1949)—was the dominant theory for the first half of the twentieth century,
and in its strongest form identified mental states with behavioral dispositions. The view died for various
good reasons, and initially gave way to type-identity theory (Smart 1959, Feigl 1958, Place 1956), which
identifies mental properties with neural properties. Identity theory was quickly superseded by
functionalism (Putnam 1967), which says that mental properties are identical to causally-defined
functional properties.
The most serious difficulty these physicalist theories of mind now face is the charge that no such
theory can adequately account for subjective experience.3 This is the now-well-known “hard problem” of
consciousness (Chalmers 1995): it is difficult to reconcile the existence of rich subjective experience with
a purely physicalist account of nature. It can be supposed that the brain is a sort of naturally evolved,
entirely physical machine—a rather unusual, wet, chaotic and enormously complex machine, but
nonetheless a machine. If we start from a simple environment-registering and behavior-modifying
machine like a thermostat, it it hard to image how adding more complexity, or even introducing
biologically-based mechanisms, could generate the “what it is like” of subjective experience.
Philosophers such as Frank Jackson (1982) and David Chalmers (1996) have articulated these
intuitions into more precise arguments, which have various modal and other suppositions built into them,
but I think this idea—that no mere physical machine, which is nothing more than a dynamic arrangement
of lower-level unfeeling physical components, could really feel like we do—is at the heart of the issue.
The via negativa account of physicalism—which emerged out of a perceived insufficiency of theory-based
physicalism to address Hempel’s dilemma—endeavors to explain the self-identification of philosophers

3

This is not to suggest that the hard problem is the only source of criticism for any given physicalist
theory of mind. For instance, any such theory ought to comport to the available empirical evidence, which
is a source of more specific criticism of particular theories, not to mention a host of other considerations
that apply to appropriate theory selection. However, I take it that the hard problem is more influential and
wide-ranging than other, more specific objections to particular views.
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working on this problem as ‘physicalist’ or ‘nonphysicalist’ relative to their commitment to fundamental
mentality. Via negativa physicalism says that physicalism is true if there is nothing which is both
fundamental and mental. God and Cartesian souls seem to violate this criterion—since they are generally
defined as fundamentally mental phenomena—whereas brains and computer systems do not—since their
mentality ultimately depends on the nonmental properties of their parts.
This brings my narrative of the development of physicalism up to the present. We’ve seen that
physicalism is the view that replaced materialism as the appropriate metaphysics of science, which would
simultaneously provide a satisfying and plausible answer to the problem of how mind and body interact.
There are two popular ways of understanding physicalism: theory-based physicalism and via negativa
physicalism. I indicated that many—perhaps all—of the significant metaphysical accounts from the past
bear relationships to those philosophers’ existential concerns. What is the relationship between
physicalism and our existential concerns? Does physicalism also have some relationship to our personal
hopes, cares and fears? What, if anything, is at stake if physicalism is true or false? Before I can answer
these questions in section three, some ground clearing is in order.
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II. Problems for via negativa physicalism

The metaphysical view called ‘physicalism’ asserts that there is nothing over and above the physical—if
physicalism is true, then everything that exists is identical to, constituted by, or entirely dependent upon
physical things. This view has become nearly orthodox in contemporary analytic philosophy, often
operating as an assumed background condition against which other discussions occur. Despite its
massive popularity and influence, physicalism itself is not well understood. This is because the ‘physical’
in ‘nothing over and above the physical’ is underdefined, with different precisifications yielding different
sorts of physicalism—and as yet, there is no consensus on the right way to refine the definition.
A common way to understand the physical is as whatever is referred to by our best physics
(Hellman and Thompson 1975; Smart 1978; Hellman 1985; Poland 1994; Melnyk 1997, 2007; Stoljar
2001). Unfortunately, this theory-based approach faces Hempel’s (1949, 1969) well-known dilemma:
‘physics’ is ambiguous, and can either refer to current physics or future physics. If ‘physics’ refers to
current physics, a problem arises: there are yet-to-be-discovered entities and properties which are
outside of the scope of current physics. Because current physics does not refer to these undiscovered
things, their existence makes current-physics physicalism false. However, if ‘physics’ refers to future
physics, then physicalism is vague to the point of meaninglessness, since we do not know what the
content of future physics will be.
This dilemma from Hempel has constituted the strongest motivation for philosophers to come up
with a more adequate notion of the physical. Perhaps most notable is the via negativa account (Smith
1993, Papinueau and Spurrett 1999, Levine 2001, Montero 2005, Montero and Papineau 2005, Worley
2006), which in its most basic form says that ‘physical’ means ‘not fundamentally mental’. I follow
Jonathan Schaffer (2010) in understanding ‘fundamental’ to mean ‘depends on nothing else’. Properties
that bear metaphysical dependence relations between each other—as opposed to causal dependence
relations—follow a hierarchical ordering from less to more fundamental.
Something is fundamentally mental if it is mental and does not depend on anything that is more
fundamental—mentality of this sort is at the bottom of nature, so to speak. Cartesian souls, assuming
they are fundamentally mental things, count as non-physical under this understanding of ‘physical’;
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whereas subatomic particles, if they are both fundamental and non-mental, are physical. Objects such as
brains, which seem to be entirely composed out of non-mental parts, with properties that ultimately
depend only on non-mental properties, can possess non-fundamental mentality without making via
negativa physicalism false.
Not everyone agrees that the via negativa approach suffices to explain what it takes for
something to be physical. For instance, Seth Crook and Carl Gillett (2001) and Jessica Wilson (2006)
assert that this is a necessary condition on being physical, but not sufficient—they agree that physicalists
should accept a “No Fundamental Mentality” constraint, but think something more is required to flesh out
the notion of physicality. However, nearly everyone agrees that a No Fundamental Mentality constraint is,
at minimum, a necessary condition for any version of physicalism: if anything exists in a world which is
both fundamental and mental, then physicalism is rendered false in that world, regardless of whatever
else physicalism requires.
Unfortunately for those who would like to use via negativa or No Fundamental Mentality to define
or help define physicalism, closer inspection reveals that these principles must be rejected. This is
because deeming that physicalism is false in any world which contains fundamental mentality leads to the
wrong ruling on certain possible worlds that physicalists have hitherto largely neglected. These are (i)
worlds which are have no fundamental properties, and (ii) worlds in which priority monism is true.
The traditional view of metaphysical dependence says that all properties in a world ultimately
depend on the properties of the most mereologically basic constituents of that world—I’ll call this
traditional view “priority partism”. Worlds which are infinitely decomposable contain no mereologically
basic components—and so no fundamental properties, if priority partism is accepted. In worlds where
priority monism is true, the fundamental properties are the properties of the whole cosmos, rather than
the smallest bits of the universe. Both of these types of worlds can contain mental properties which via
negativa must say are physically unacceptable. Yet, when we look at the details, it turns out that certain
of these mental properties ought to count as physically acceptable by any reasonable standard. So via
negativa and No Fundamental Mentality must be rejected or radically revised.
What follows is organized into two main parts, which are taken from two different papers. The first
major part (numbered 1.1, 1.2, …) discusses an infinite descent of physically acceptable mental
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properties in an infinitely decomposable world. The version of via negativa that has been developed to
accommodate such infinitely decomposable worlds wrongly rules that physicalism must be false in such a
world. The second major part (numbered 2.1, 2.2, …) discusses physically acceptable mental properties
realized at the level of the whole of nature in priority monist worlds, which trivially means they are
fundamental under priority monism. Via negativa and No Fundamental Mentality straightforwardly make
the wrong ruling on these worlds.

1.1. Infinitely descending mentality a physical world
Physicalism is typically thought of as the thesis that everything depends upon a fundamental physical
level. In Barry Loewer's words, physicalism is true if and only if "all facts obtain in virtue of the distribution
of the fundamental [physical] entities and properties" (Loewer, 2001, p. 2). On this reading of physicalism,
the world is composed of levels with hierarchical dependence relations between them; put more simply,
physicalism says that the way that things are at a higher level is determined by how things are at lower
levels.4 For instance, the macro-level property of fluidity that belongs to water depends upon chemical
properties of water molecules, and those properties depend in turn upon atomic properties of hydrogen
and oxygen atoms, and so on until at some point one arrives at the fundamental level, which is the level
upon which everything else depends.
That is the standard view of physicalism; however, it has an infrequently noted and arguably
unacceptable consequence. Namely, as discussed by Montero (2006), Brown and Ladyman (2009),
Schaffer (2003), and Nagasawa (2012), it rules physicalism as false in worlds that have no fundamental
level. For example, the standard formulation makes physicalism come out false in worlds in which things
like fermions and bosons, which physicists currently take to be fundamental, are instead composed of
other lower-level things, and the lower-level components of the fermions and bosons are themselves
composed of even lower-level things, and so on ad finitum. Although there are people who revile
physicalism, they don't revile it for this reason. Rather, physicalists and nonphysicalists alike think that if
4I’m

using the term ‘thing’ loosely, and not to mean ‘object’ or ‘entity’. I want to remain neutral on whether levels
are composed of properties, entities, events, states, facts, etc. These are important distinctions, but here I do not
think it will matter, and I will sometimes shift between these different ways of thinking of levels. My natural
inclination, which I think is a straightforward approach and is used by Kim (1993), is to think of levels in terms of
mereological relations between entities, with properties realized by entities at a given level.
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physicalism turns out to be false, it will be because there are non-physical things in the world, and not
because we live in a world that has no fundamental level.
Is the mere conceivability of a world with an infinite descent of levels something that those who
aim to formulate a viable version of physicalism need to worry about? After all, many physicists today take
the Planck length, which is the theoretical shortest measurable length as determined by the uncertainty
principle, to be the smallest spatial value that is meaningful to discuss, as notions of space and length
seem to be no longer applicable at conceivably smaller distances. While this is what current physics says
about the smallest scale at which physical things can possibly exist in our world, our formulation of
physicalism should not rest on this specific claim in physics: it is epistemically possible that the current
view about Planck length is false, and if false that should not affect the truth or falsity of physicalism.
Further, we should be seeking to have a notion of physicalism applicable to non-actual worlds, such as
the infinitely decomposable worlds just described, regardless of the how the actual world is structured.
Can physicalism be revised so that it does not refer to a fundamental level? The only attempts to
do this—most significantly in Montero (2006), Brown and Ladyman (2009) and Schaffer (2015)—
designate a divide in the world between a subvening set of non-mental bottom levels and a supervening
set of mental top levels. These formulations say that physicalism is false in worlds with an infinite descent
of the mental, that is, worlds which are mental all the way down. Yet, as I will argue, physicalism can be
true even in worlds with infinite descents of mentality, and thus such formulations of physicalism ought to
be rejected. In other words, we ought to reject any formulation of physicalism that entails that physicalism
is false in worlds with an infinite descent of mental properties. Not only that: because those formulations
are the only attempts so far to specify a thesis of physicalism applicable to infinitely decomposable
worlds, and assuming that it is reasonable to see such worlds as possible, this means we are left with no
satisfactory dependence-based account of physicalism.
I will get to this conclusion by closely looking at the view that has been developed to make
physicalism consistent with worlds that have infinite descents. After this, a general account of mentality
will be developed which is consistent with various physicalism-friendly theories of mentality. Finally I will
use that account of mentality to describe a world that is completely mental at all of its infinite levels of
decomposition, yet in which physicalism might plausibly be true.
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1.2. Physicalism and infinite descents
How can we formulate physicalism so as to account for the possibility of a world that has no fundamental
level? Here, thus far, is the only approach: rather than stating physicalism as the thesis that everything
depends or supervenes on an entirely physical fundamental level, take physicalism to be the thesis that
everything depends or supervenes on phenomena that themselves depend only on physical phenomena.
On this approach, one assumes that there is some line that naturally distinguishes the fundamentally
physical set of infinite bottom levels from the set of higher levels that depend upon them. The world is like
a layer cake, similar to how it is in the hierarchical model that includes a fundamental level, but it is a cake
with an infinite number of lower layers instead of a single bottom layer, and some significant distinction
between the lower levels and the upper levels. To further this imperfect but hopefully helpful analogy,
think of all the layers below some point on the infinite towering cake as dense chocolate, and they support
foamy and insubstantial whipped cream layers above. The infinite descent of dense chocolate is the
narrowly physical base for the broadly physical light whipped cream layers.5
On Jonathan Schaffer’s view in Is There a Fundamental Level? (2003), this picture is not only
imperfect but is of no use at all since, as he sees it there, "(p)hysicalism is an irreparably foundationalist
doctrine because it requires an ontologically motivated distinction between the primary physical base, and
that which, like the mental, is derivative"(2003, pg. 10).6 Further, "(t)he fundamental level provided such a
distinction, by introducing a discontinuity in nature where the pattern of division was broken”(2003, pg.
10). The distinction between what is fundamental and everything else is, on this view, sufficiently
motivated to stand as the dividing line between physical base properties and those that depend on them,
while any non-fundamental level we might choose as our line would be arbitrary. For instance, in a world
without a fundamental level, we might choose the atomic level as the dividing line such that if everything
above that level depends on everything below it, physicalism is true. But why should we choose the
5

Brown and Ladyman (2009) correctly point out that such a layer cake model of the physical world is far too
simple—the world is considerably messier than that, and if the metaphor were accurate at all the cake would be
wildly uneven and have many sections not supporting any whipped cream. Still, I think the metaphor is useful as a
rough visual illustration of levels of nature. A further issue: some philosophers, e.g. Dupré (1993), are highly
skeptical of any levels-based metaphysical account. While such skepticism may be warranted, here I am
responding to literature that takes a levels-based model as a starting point, and thus am assuming such a model.
6As noted above, Schaffer has more recently changed his mind on the relation between physicalism and infinitely
decomposable worlds, and now advocates Montero’s (2006) view, but I am using his earlier position for dialectical
purposes.
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atomic rather than the chemical or the biological, or even the psychological? Returning to the cake
analogy, the chocolate/whipped cream divide in a simple two layer cake is significant, but—on Shaffer’s
view—once we have an infinite number of layers, no divide is any more significant than any other. So
Schaffer thinks physicalism is false in infinitely decomposable worlds. But must it be?
Montero (2006) contends that physicalism can still be true in infinitely decomposable worlds, and
that there is a plausible non-arbitrary point at which we can demarcate the subvenience base from what
supervenes on it. Schaffer even points to it in the quotation above when he refers to the derivative
mental that is distinct from the fundamental physical: there is a divide in nature between the mental and
the non-mental. For Robin Brown and James Ladyman (2009) this division is what unites early materialist
and later physicalist world-views. On this account of physicalism, the physical subvenience base is the
infinite set of all the non-mental levels below the lowest mental level. Supposing mentality exists only at
the person level in the actual world, then the non-mental neural, chemical, atomic, subatomic, and so
forth levels below the level of persons form the subvenience base. These philosophers assert that
physicalism can be true in infinitely decomposable worlds so long as there is no mentality below some
level. And an infinitely decomposable world that is mental all the way down, or at which one can always
find a lower mental level, is a world in which physicalism is false.
The solution to the infinite descent problem for physicalism offered by Montero is consistent with
a broader stance on how to define physicalism, labeled “via negativa physicalism.” This view, which
seems to be growing in popularity, defines physicalism in terms of what it is not, delineating physical
worlds as those worlds that do not instantiate things like ghosts, gods, miraculous events, souls or
human-independent moral laws. This is the strategy adopted, in one form or another, by Montero (2005),
Spurrett and Papinueau (1999), Levine (2001), Worley (2006) and Montero and Papineau (2005).
Montero’s response to infinite descent—which is a rather sophisticated version of this view that describes
which levels, designated in terms of dependence relations to each other, will make physicalism false by
instantiating mentality—cannot be invoked without also advocating via negativa physicalism, since it rules
which infinitely decomposable worlds are physical by which properties are not realized infinitely below
some level.
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Could a non-via-negativa notion of physicalism be modified to accommodate worlds without a
fundamental level? Perhaps Stoljar’s (2001a) theory-based account of physicalism, which roughly says
that physicalism is true if and only if everything fundamental that exists is specified by physics, could be
amended to include the claim that physicalism is false if there is an infinite descent below some level of
entities or properties that are not specified by physics. However, this seems to give Hempel’s (1969)
well-known dilemma against theory-based formulations of physicalism more bite in any worlds without a
fundamental level: if ‘physics’ is specified to mean current physics, then physicalism is radically
incomplete and thus false. If ‘physics’ is taken to mean a future and complete physics, then physicalism
encompasses so many more things than we are familiar with that the thesis becomes vague to the point
of meaninglessness. Regardless, the via negativa criterion is generally taken to be at least necessary for
physicalism (as in Wilson 2006), so the argument I present should be a challenge to other conceptions of
physicalism even if they are able to accommodate infinitely decomposable worlds.
Montero’s solution would be a great way to rescue physicalism. The only problem is that it doesn't
work. The reason it doesn't work is it turns out that there can be worlds in which physicalism is true and
yet there is an infinite descent of mental levels. How can this be?
1.3. A compositional account of mentality
My goal here is to describe a possible world with an infinite descent of mental levels, yet in which
physicalism is true—to make this intelligible I will elaborate on what kind of mentality exists at every level
of that world. Begin by considering a real-world brain: if physicalism is true, and eliminativism about the
mental is false, in virtue of what does the brain get its mentality from? That is, why does this particular
physical system—the brain—have mental properties?
It turns out that there is a commonality most physicalism-friendly theories of mentality share—
these views will have the brain count as mental in virtue of the relational properties of the parts of the
brain. “Relational properties” has a wide scope, and is intended to cover both stereotypically relational
properties, like spatiotemporal and structural properties, as well as causal and dispositional properties,
which are properties that govern the behavior of and interactions between things. I will call mentality of
this sort “compositional mentality”.
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Compositional mentality is a background condition for all physicalist theories of mind which are
substrate-neutral—that is, all views which say mental properties depend on properties that are not
specific to the lower-level realizers of those properties. This includes all varieties of role functionalism, as
well as informational and representational theories, and—as I will show—may even include certain
versions of identity theory.
Allow me to demonstrate with role functionalism. Role functionalism identifies mental properties
with functional roles, where a functional role is a higher-order property that functionally describes some
other property or properties at a level (see Witmer 2003)—the functional role of being the bait in a
mousetrap is a property of the cheese, but is not identical to the property of being cheese (since, after all,
it could have been played by peanut butter)—and which is defined by input-output relations and state
transitions. For instance, the functional role of pain might be defined as anything that is caused by stimuli
that we normally label as pain-causing, like bodily harm to enervated tissue, and which has output to
appropriate other mental states—like the thought ‘damn that hurts!’—and to pain-avoiding behavior.7 This
is ‘role’ functionalism as opposed to ‘realizer’ functionalism because it assigns mentality to the functional
role rather than any particular lower-order realizer.
In the case of the brain, functional roles are realized by parts that are interacting in the right way.
Once you get excited neurons spitting chemicals out at each other and creating networks of
electrochemical neural activity correctly, you get functionally-characterized mentality for free. Of course,
to get the neurons doing this you must arrange their parts—biochemical and atomic components—
properly, and so too must arrange all of the lower level components, like quarks and electrons, in a
roughly correct way as well. I say “roughly” because presumably below some level there can be changes
in component arrangement without changes in mental state—these changes are in the so-called noise
and are irrelevant to the higher-level functional role. This general account will be true for any mental thing,
not just a brain: to realize a functionally-characterized mental state or property, just put the interacting
parts—be they neurons, microchips or alien goo—together in the right way.

7

This is obviously a simplification of which and how many input-output relations are sufficient for realization of
pain on any functionalist story, but the more elaborate account—perhaps involving Ramsey sentences that
quantify over sets of named functionally-characterized mental properties for a given theory—will be more-or-less
along the same lines.
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One might object that this characterization of the world—involving breakdown of macro-level
objects into discrete interacting components—sounds too naïvely mechanistic. It might eventually be
revealed that, instead of discrete particle-like things, the world is composed of fields without well-defined
boundaries, and that the low-level entities are more like clouds than billiard balls. And certainly if we look
at the brain as a biological system we don’t see something like Leibnitz’s mill in miniature but, as Peter
Godfrey-Smith (forthcoming) calls it, a “molecular storm” of activity. I certainly don’t want to commit, either
at the microphysical or the biological level, to an overly simplistic and mechanistic view of nature—but
luckily, I don’t think I am so committed.
The core features of the view here—that relational properties of constituents are what count for
generation of physicalism-friendly mentality—can survive even if the components are field-like and
boundary-less, or even weirder than that. Functionally-characterized mentality will still depend on
interaction among parts, regardless of how those parts are described—and I think the brain case makes
this eminently clear. For the brain, relational properties of the parts are doing the work to implement a
functional state, regardless of what squishy, chaotic, messy kind of thing a neuron is.
Role functionalism relies on the relations among the parts of a physical system to generate
mentality, and nothing further is required. The same is true for informational theories, which say that
something is mental if it realizes appropriate informational properties, e.g. some minimum level of
informational integration (Tononi 2007). Informational properties are substrate-neutral, and depend
entirely upon structural and dynamical features of the system. So too for representational theories, though
the story is a but trickier: for most contemporary physicalists, some system is representational if its inner
states reliably match states of the world, and some addition requirement is met, like the system has the
function to perform representation due to its evolutionary history (e.g. Millikan 1989). Such
representational properties are structural, though they depend on relations between structures in the mind
and structures in the world, and sometimes enormously temporally or spatially extended structures (as
under evolutionary versions of teleosemantics). Nonetheless, it is relational properties (again, broadly
construed) which are relevant to the generation of mentality for these theories.
The odd theory out is identity theory, which in its most common form identifies mental properties
with neural properties. On first pass, neural properties are not substrate neutral, and thus do not depend
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for realization only on relational properties of the parts of the brain. It seems that even if the very same
relational properties realized by the parts of a brain could be realized by a virtual brain in a digital
simulation, that digital brain would not truly realize neural properties. Though this sounds right, there is a
way to treat neural properties which would make identity theory consistent with compositional mentality: if
all properties are individuated by their causal dispositions, as perhaps under dispositional essentialism,
then neural properties are identical to complex combinations of lower-level relational properties. This
allows neural properties to count as instances of compositional mental properties. However, this line of
thinking is metaphysically speculative, and I’ll leave identity theory aside in what follows.
Though compositional mentality is a background condition for many theories of mind that are
widely held to be consistent with physicalism, this view is also consistent with an account of mentality that
is incompatible with physicalism: necessitarian dualism (White 2018, Brown forthcoming). Like typical
physicalism, this nonstandard nonphysicalist view holds that mental properties are necessitated by
relational properties of the parts of a system, but additionally asserts that the mental properties which are
necessitated are non-physical.
I would like to use compositional mentality to generate an infinite descent of prima facie
physicalism-compatible mentality. To avoid issues with necessitarian dualism, I will bracket this sort of
mentality: the worlds which I will describe are worlds in which necessitarian dualism is false. Since
compositional mentality is consistent with many other accounts of mentality which are widely recognized
as physically kosher, an instance of (non-necessitarian dualist) compositional mentality in a world ought
to prima facie count as mentality which is consistent with physicalism. To put it another way, once
necessitarian dualism is ruled out, it would be quite surprising to find an instance of compositional
mentality which renders physicalism false.
1.4. Quasi-brains all the way down
Now, equipped with this composition-dependent, physicalism-friendly notion of mentality, I can finally
describe my all-mental and all-physical world—MPW for short. MPW is, of course, one with an infinitely
descending series of levels—there are no smallest entities nor basic properties that this world is ultimately
grounded in. Moreover, every level has a high compositional complexity—thinking of levels
mereologically, any entity at any level n has many constituent parts at the next lowest level, n-1. How
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many? At least as many as are required to realize minimal mentality for the thing that the parts compose.
If mentality comes cheaply, as some generous functionalists have suggested, then entities might not
need to decompose into terribly many parts; but if mentality requires a high degree of complexity, then
each entity is composed of however many parts are required for such complexity.
Next imagine that MPW contains a single highest-level system—I say system to indicate that it is
something with a complex mereological structure and dynamic causal relationships among its parts—
called Alex. Nothing else exists in this world apart from the single, internally sophisticated thing under
consideration. Further, upon inspection of the system and its properties we find—lo and behold!—it is a
thinking (or feeling/experiencing) thing. That is, Alex has mental properties.
Why is Alex mental? For the same kind of reason you are: Alex has parts that are dynamically
arranged in such a way that they produce mentality for the thing they compose. As I said above, I believe
that this is the common feature of nearly all physicalism-friendly stories about mentality. For instance, if
functionalism is true, then Alex gets mentality because the constituents of Alex at the level immediately
below are causally related just so that they realize functional roles.
This gives mentality to the thing at the highest level of the world, but what about my promise of
making mentality ubiquitous, all the way down? Well, just iterate the story I told about Alex for all of Alex’s
parts. Alex is made of many interacting components, call them Bretts. Collectively all the Bretts, through
their interactions, generate Alex’s mentality. But also each Brett is mental, for the same reason Alex is.
Remember that every entity has high compositional complexity—every Brett has many parts, call them
Charlies, which cause the Brett to be mental in virtue of the Charlies’ interactions. And the same story
goes for each Charlie which is composed of little Devins, and so on infinitely.
It is sort of like if you could replace your brain’s neurons with tiny brains that are connected to
each other and which realize the same functional relations your neurons had with each other, and then
also replace the neurons of the constituent neuron-replacing brains with more, littler brains, and so on
and on and on (see Block 1978 for a similar case). A (Alex) is mental in virtue of the relations between the
Bs (Bretts) that compose A, and the Bs in virtue of the relations between the Cs, and Cs the Ds, without
end for all of the infinite pairs of levels. The most notable difference between role functionalist and typeidentity accounts of mentality in this system is that some particular mental property can be realized at
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different levels—for Alex, Bretts, Charlies and so on—under role functionalism, and mental properties are
level-specific under type-identity theory, such that Alex and a Brett can never have exactly the same
mental property.
There it is—a world that is completely mental at all of its infinite levels of decomposition. Every
entity at every level has mental properties in virtue of the next-lower-level compositional structure of that
entity. But why should you agree that physicalism could be true in MPW? After all, it violates one of the
criteria given above for when a world is to count as physical: no infinitely descending all-mental levels. Of
course this is exactly the principle that I am challenging, so an argument is required to show that it does
not count as physical. Yet, I see none in the offing.8
In MPW mentality is generated at every level through the dynamic compositional structure of
lower level entities—remember that this is how all physicalism-friendly accounts of mentality work. In
essence, I am just positing many, many quasi-brains—brains all the way down, if you will. The
substantive issue cannot be the sheer volume of mentality in MPW, because we can imagine an infinitely
large universe nomically similar to ours, but with an infinite number of humans in it: such a world has an
infinite number of mental properties, yet it is conceivably physical. And to say that MPW is nonphysical
only because it contains an infinite descent of mentality is clearly question-begging.
Alternately, one might argue that physicalism is true in MPW, and that what I have described is
not genuinely in tension with the no-infinite-descents-of-mentality criterion. There are various ways one
might do this. One might think that physicalism entails eliminativism—not a very popular route for a
physicalist, but it would trivially mean that no way of arranging only physical things could produce
mentality. Given that most physicalists are not eliminativists, and that MPW straightforwardly contains
physicalism-friendly mentality, the other option is to say that the kind of mentality in my world is not the
8

Additionally, one might wonder about the relationship between MPW and panpsychism: panpsychism is typically
understood as the thesis that all fundamental entities have both physical and mental properties. This conception is
problematic because, like physicalism defined in terms of fundamentality, it has panpsychism come out as trivially
false in worlds with an infinite descent of levels. It seems that any plausible revision to panpsychism which allows it
to be true in a world without a fundamental level will have panpsychism come out true MPW: if panpsychism is
revised into the thesis that mental and physical properties are ubiquitous at every level of nature below some
level, then panpsychism so conceived is true in MPW. However, it seems that panpsychism might be false in
MPW—after all, the mental properties in MPW are characterized as consistent with physicalism. This is the inverse
of the problem that MPW raises for physicalism—panpsychism is true in MPW when it should come out false,
versus physicalism being false in MPW when it should come out as true—and to me it seems just as difficult to
resolve.
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kind of mentality that the physicalist had in mind when she came up with her sufficient-for-false condition.
So a slight amendment to the criterion is in order, to make it say something like ‘only an infinite descent of
a certain kind of mentality is sufficient to make physicalism false’.
How should this physicalism-hostile kind of mentality be characterized? One might be tempted to
say that the so-called “bad mentality” is any kind other than that characterized by a particular physicalismfriendly theory of the mental. A strategy like this is pursued by Tiehen (2015), who says that physicalism
is committed to functionalism: if he is right, then only functionalist mentality can exist in a physical world,
and no amount of this sort of mentality can make physicalism false—even an infinite descent of it.
However, I have already shown that this response won’t work for the world I have described. Mentality in
MPW is consistent with various theories of mentality—it contains an infinite descent of functionallycharacterized

mentality,

as

well

as

informationally-characterized

mentality,

and

perhaps

representationally-characterized mentality. So exempting mentality as described by a particular
acceptable theory won’t make physicalism true in my world, since MPW also contains an infinite descent
of differently-characterized mentality.
But maybe there is a way to characterize categorize types of mentality more generally, such that
an infinite descent of any physicalism-friendly kind of mentality is not sufficient to make physicalism false.
In fact, it seems I have provided just such a characterization—perhaps an infinite descent of mental
properties that depend for realization only on structural-dynamic arrangement of constituent parts is
consistent with the truth of physicalism.
That seems promising, but it won’t work either—there are anti-physicalist accounts that say
mentality depends only on structural-dynamic arrangement of constituents. Emergent dualism says that
arranging low-level things such that they have appropriate structural-dynamical relations to each other
generates emergence of non-physical mental properties. If physicalism ought to be false in such a world,
then the constitutive account of mentality is perhaps a necessary component of physicalism-friendly
mentality, but not sufficient.
A different critique is to say that nothing in MPW is genuinely mental. If so, then MPW doesn’t
contain an infinite descent of mentality, and there is no issue for physicalism. One might think this
because she believes that no mental thing can have another mental thing as a part, perhaps on the
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grounds that such systems as Block’s (1978) Chinese nation or Searle’s (1980) Chinese room shouldn’t
count as genuinely mental even if functionalism is true. Both of these fictional systems are mereologically
and functionally sophisticated, enough to be mental on most functionalist accounts, but they have human
beings as constituents that are involved in functional processes.
One response to this objection comes from cognitive science: arguably the human brain is
composed of mental sub-systems. This is doubly evident if any modularity thesis is true—which would
mean, as in Fodor (1983), that there are process specific, hard-wired, informationally encapsulated and
cognitively impenetrable mental sub-systems that compose more general human mentality (in particular in
the perceptual system). If this is right, then it seems a physicalist who denies that mental systems can
have parts that are mental must deny mentality to the human brain—surely not an acceptable
consequence. Perhaps, one might respond, these sub-personal systems should be deemed not truly
mental, but then what is the criterion a physicalist can give for when something is to count as mental?
This is especially worrying if these systems are treated as genuinely mental by cognitive scientists.
A different kind of response comes from Eric Schwitzgebel (2015), who argues that there are
nomically possible alien creatures who could be constructed out of undeniably mental parts, and who
would be mental. He argues that it would be chauvinistic for humans to deny that such beings—some of
which might resemble incredibly sophisticated ant colonies—could have mentality, given they would
exhibit all the other hallmarks of having mental lives, for instance the ability to have conversations about
what kind of tea they most enjoy the taste of. Further, such beings must have mental properties if
physicalism or materialism is true, since all physicalism-friendly accounts of mentality say that there is
nothing more to mentality than the properties realized by these odd systems—and this is consistent with
the treatment of mentality I am offering.
As an additional consideration, one might wonder about the relationship between MPW and
panpsychism: panpsychism is typically understood as the thesis that all fundamental entities have both
physical and mental properties. This conception is problematic because, like physicalism defined in terms
of fundamentality, it has panpsychism come out as trivially false in worlds with an infinite descent of
levels. It seems that any plausible revision to panpsychism which allows it to be true in a world without a
fundamental level will have panpsychism come out true in MPW: if panpsychism is revised into the thesis
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that mental and physical properties are ubiquitous at every level of nature below some level, then
panpsychism so conceived is true in MPW. However, it seems that panpsychism might be false in
MPW—after all, the mental properties in MPW are characterized as consistent with physicalism. This is
the inverse of the problem that MPW raises for physicalism—panpsychism is true in MPW when it should
come out false, versus physicalism being false in MPW when it should come out as true.
One way to resolve this tension is to give up the idea that panpsychism and physicalism are
inconsistent with one another; this raises an issue with Jessica Wilson’s (2006) response to Stoljar’s
(2001b) argument that panpsychism is consistent with physicalism. Stoljar claims that panpsychism
merely posits more and stranger mental properties than we typically suppose exist, but that quantity and
location of mentality alone is not enough to make physicalism false. Against this, Wilson argues that
physicalism must contain a “No Fundamental Mentality” (NFM) constraint—this is the same as the via
negativa account of physicalism, but employed as a necessary condition rather than a definition, and she
thinks this principle explains why panpsychism is inconsistent with physicalism. However, the sibling to
Wilson’s NFM constraint which would apply to worlds without an infinite descent of levels is Montero’s no
infinite descent of mental properties constraint—yet, as I have been arguing, there are plausibly physical
worlds that violate such a constraint. Perhaps this indicates, contrary to Wilson, that some notion of
panpsychism is consistent with physicalism.
1.5. Conclusion
The argument presented here is aimed at via negativa physicalism, which says that physicalism is false in
a world if that world realizes fundamental or an infinite descent of mental properties—and so far this is the
only dependence-based account which allows physicalism to be true in infinitely decomposable worlds.
The problem, which I exploited to build an infinitely descending all-mental and all-physical world, is that
‘mental’ is underspecified. In effect, via negativa physicalists are defining an opaque term with an even
more opaque term—there is even less agreement over what ‘mental’ means than what ‘physical’ means.
However, via negativa’s cloud has a silver lining, since it seems this problem might be resolved by being
more careful about what is meant by ‘mental’. Doing so might supply an unexpected boon to via
negativa—there is something oddly insubstantial about via negativa’s definition of physicalism; after all, it
does not positively define what the physical is, but only what it is not. Fleshing out a general physically-
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acceptable notion of mentality would answer not only the problem posed in this dissertation, but perhaps
would add the meat that is lacking from via negativa’s bones.

2.1 Fundamental mentality in physical worlds
Nearly everyone accepts that the existence of fundamental mentality would render physicalism false. I
believe this widely held view is false: there is a class of possible worlds which contain fundamental
mentality and in which physicalism is plausibly true. These are worlds in which priority monism (Schaffer
2010)—which is the view that the properties of the whole of nature are fundamental, rather than the
properties of the smallest parts—is true, and in which the whole of nature is a mental system of a certain
sort. Schaffer (2010, p. 31-32) describes a priority monist as saying that:

[…] the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical
explanation dangling downward from the One […] The core tenet of historical monism is not that
the whole has no parts, but rather that the whole is prior to its parts. […] The historical debate is
not a debate over which objects exist, but rather a debate over which objects are fundamental. I
will defend the monistic view, so interpreted: the world has parts, but the parts are dependent
fragments of an integrated whole.

Priority monism is distinguished from what I will call “priority partism”, which says that the smallest
parts of the world and their properties are fundamental. To illustrate: if everything is ultimately composed
of subatomic particles, then priority partism deems that subatomic particles and their properties are
fundamental. Priority monism, in contrast, would assert that the properties of subatomic entities ultimately
depend on the properties of the whole cosmos.
Since any properties of the whole of nature trivially count as fundamental under priority monism, it
follows that the mentality of a world-encompassing mental system is trivially fundamental in a priority
monist world. If this mentality is of a physically acceptable sort, then physicalism ought to count as true in
some of these worlds—despite the existence of fundamental mentality! For instance, in a priority monist
world containing only a single functioning brain—and absolutely nothing else—the mentality of that brain
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trivially counts as fundamental. Yet, at a glance, its mentality seems physically unproblematic. I will
describe several such worlds in a way that will draw out the plausibility that physicalism is true in them.
As I see it, the problem with via negativa and No Fundamental Mentality is that they are too
crude: beyond a fundamental/non-fundamental contrast, these theses do not sufficiently make a
distinction between mentality that is physically acceptable versus mentality that is physically
unacceptable. As I argued in the first section, this leads to problems in certain worlds which are infinitely
decomposable, such that they contain no smallest parts and—assuming priority partism—no fundamental
properties. There is a class of such worlds which contain an infinite descent of mentality, yet in which
physicalism is plausibly true, in virtue of the sort of mentality that those worlds contain. Attention to priority
monism reveals a similar result in worlds containing fundamental mentality.
Here is the roadmap for what follows: section 2.2. will describe worlds in which priority monism is
true and which realize compositional mentality at the level of the whole of nature. Section 2.3. will
respond to anticipated objections, and section 2.4. will conclude.
2.2. Universe-sized Minds in Priority Monist Worlds
Priority monism is an unconventional metaphysical thesis about what properties in a world are
fundamental. This view has received its best contemporary articulation and defense by Jonathan Schaffer
(2010), in which he defines priority monism as the view that the properties of the whole of nature are
fundamental, with the properties of the parts of the universe ultimately dependent on the properties of the
whole. This is in contrast with the traditional view—priority partism—which deems that only the properties
of the smallest things in existence are fundamental. The traditional view received an early explicit
articulation by Putnam and Oppenheim (1958), and has been taken for granted by analytic
metaphysicians until only recently.
Schaffer contends that if priority monism is true in any world, then it is true in all worlds. He
additionally provides several examples and arguments involving massive quantum entanglement, infinite
decomposability and a well-groundedness principle (which is the idea that all chains of dependence must
ultimately be grounded in fundamental properties) to demonstrate that priority monism is true in some
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worlds.9 The first, largely assumed contention of Schaffer’s is unnecessary for my argument. I take it not
everyone will agree that if priority monism (or some other metaphysics of dependence, for that matter) is
true in any particular world, then it must be true in all worlds (see Siegel 2016). Regardless, all that
matters here is that priority monism could be true in some world.
Why think priority monist worlds are possible? Here is a reason: priority monism does not seem to
be a contradictory thesis—after all, there does not seem to be anything in the concept of fundamentality
to deem that only the properties of the smallest things in existence can be fundamental. If this is right,
then a world in which priority monism is true is, at minimum, negatively conceivable—being conceptually
non-contradictory is sufficient for this sort of conceivability (I’m borrowing from the terminology of
Chalmers 2010). If, as Chalmers argues, negative conceivability entails possibility, then priority monism is
metaphysically possible. Of course, not everyone agrees that the non-contradictoriness of a conceived
state of affairs entails that such a state of affairs is possible. So, I must admit that my overall argument
rests on the conditional ‘if priority monism could be true in some possible world, then it is possible for
there to be physically acceptable fundamental mentality’—but the antecedent is not flagrantly suspect, in
my eyes.
On the assumption that priority monism is metaphysically possible, let’s look at the details of how
compositional mentality—which I described in section 1.3.—could be realized at the level of the whole of
nature in a priority monist world. This is fairly easy. Imagine a world containing only a single functioning
brain. All non-brain entities in this world are parts of the brain—nothing is left floating free in the cosmic
void. This brain realizes mental properties, and those mental properties are necessitated by the
realization of appropriate relational properties of the parts of the brain. If priority partism were true in this
world, then the mental properties of the brain would not count as fundamental. Instead, the properties of
the most basic constituents of the brain, e.g. the charge and spin of its electrons, would be fundamental.

9

The gist of these arguments follows. Priority partism cannot be true in worlds which are infinitely
decomposable, since these worlds contain no smallest entities which would count as fundamental. The
well-groundedness principle says that all chains of dependence must terminate in fundamental properties,
and the only way to do this in infinitely decomposable worlds is if priority monism is true in them. I discuss
quantum entanglement at greater length in the next section, but the idea of this argument is that the
properties of quantum entangled systems supervene on the properties of the whole system, and not vice
versa. Any worlds which are “massively quantum entangled”, such that everything is entangled with
everything else, are worlds which would have the properties of all the parts ultimately dependent on the
properties of the whole, and thus the whole should count as fundamental in these worlds.
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However, add the detail that priority monism is true in this world and—presto! The mental properties of
the brain—which is the sole inhabitant of the world, so its properties are the properties of the whole of
nature—automatically count as fundamental.
As I said, easy. There seems to be nothing physically untoward about the mentality that is
realized in this world: the brain I have described is nothing like a Cartesian soul in any sense.
Panpsychism is not true in this world, nor is the priority monist version of panpsychism called
“cosmopsychism”, as has been developed by Philip Goff (2017). Aside from not being connected to a
body, the brain in this world is not in any significant respects dissimilar from an ordinary brain in the actual
world. The only things that make a metaphysical difference between the mentality in this imagined world
and ordinary mentality in the actual world are: priority monism is true in the imagined world, and the
imagined world only contains a solitary brain.
Allow me to provide one more example to flesh out this class of worlds, which will additionally
demonstrate some strange consequences that follow from the No Fundamental Mentality constraint on
physicalism. Imagine a world in which priority monism is true, which is finite in size, and which contains a
species of intelligent beings like humans. The intelligent beings in this world create a “hungry AI” which
has one goal: to incorporate everything that exists into its computer hardware, in order to increase its
cognitive powers. The AI is extremely successful, first turning organisms and rivers and mountains into
parts of its computer hardware, followed by planets and stars and galaxies. It does this by reducing
objects to their constituents, then using those constituents to expand its hardware resources.10
Eventually, the AI transforms nearly everything into parts of its cognition-realizing computer
hardware. The only thing which remains outside the AI system is a stray electron that has not yet been
incorporated. Prior to incorporating this lonely electron, the whole of nature does not realize mental
properties—rather, only a large part of nature does.
Recall that priority monism is true in this world. When the AI finally incorporates the last electron,
and the whole of nature becomes an AI system, then suddenly the mentality of the AI counts as
fundamental. This is because under priority monism, the properties of the whole are fundamental by
definition, regardless of whether those properties are mental or not. According to via negativa or No
10

This is a scenario that some AI ethicists worry about in the actual world, e.g. Bostrom (2014) and
Schneider (2018).
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Fundamental Mentality, physicalism will have gone from true to false in this world. Yet this is not a world
containing souls or panpsychic mind dust. It is just a universe containing a very powerful and large
computer system. It would be absurd to maintain that physicalism has become false in this world.
The worlds just described realize mentality that is of the compositional variety, and necessitarian
dualism is stipulated as false in them. They additionally contain fundamental mental properties—thus
making physicalism false if one accepts a No Fundamental Mentality constraint on physicalism. Yet
physicalism plausibly ought to count as true in these worlds, as well as an infinite number of others in
their class.
2.3. Objections
There are a number of objections available to those who think that the existence of fundamental mentality
is inconsistent with physicalism. However, short of fleshing out a more general account of physically
acceptable mentality that does not rely on a simple fundamental/nonfundamental distinction, I don’t think
any of these objections stick.
First: one might object that priority monism is impossible. This might be on the grounds that
priority monist worlds are ultimately inconceivable (perhaps there is a subtle contradiction in the view) or
on some other grounds. As I already admitted, this response would successfully undermine my argument:
if there are no possible worlds in which priority monism is true, then there are no possible worlds
containing physically acceptable fundamental mentality such as I have described.
I don’t have much to say in response to this objection beyond reasserting that priority monism
seems possible. I admit this might be wrong—after all, priority monism is certainly quite weird, and many
of us are naturally inclined toward priority partism (though perhaps the inclination is due to philosophical
training). However, it seems to me that the onus is on an opponent of priority monism to provide a strong
argument that it is impossible. And as yet no such argument has been articulated.
Alternately, one might think that priority monism is possible, but only if some further condition is
met—specifically, priority monism is only true in worlds which are massively quantum entangled.11 My

11

Ishmael and Schaffer (2016) further develop develop the position that worlds which are massively
quantum entangled are worlds in which priority monism is true, arguing that the parts of entangled
systems are nonseperable, which means that their states cannot be specified without referring to each
other. They think that this forces us to accept that the properties of the parts of such nonseperable
systems depend on the properties of the whole system. Calosi (2018) argues that only certain
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argument is undercut if this additional condition makes physicalism false, or if it is inconsistent with
realization of the sort of compositional mentality I described in section one. If massive quantum
entanglement is inconsistent with physicalism, then there is no sense in worrying about physically
acceptable fundamental mentality in those worlds, since physicalism would be false in them regardless.
Alternately, if massive quantum entanglement is inconsistent with whole-world compositional mentality,
then worlds such as those I described in the last section turn out to be impossible.
The basic idea motivating this objection is plausible: something seems required to make priority
monism rather than priority partism (or some other metaphysics of dependence) true in a world. It would
be bizarre if priority monism could be true in some world, and priority partism true in some other, with no
other difference between them.12 Even with this granted, neither of the subsequent claims of the objection
look right to me: no such condition by itself seems sufficient either to make physicalism false or preclude
the possibility of compositional mentality being realized for the whole of nature.
Suppose that priority monism is only true in worlds which are massively quantum entangled. In such a
world, it is nomologically impossible for some part of the world to change without all the parts of the world
also changing—but this is just a consequence of quantum entanglement, not its essence. Rather,
Schaffer (2014) defines quantum entanglement in the following way:

An entangled system is one whose state vector is not factorizable into tensor products of the
state vectors of its components:
Ψsystem ≠ Ψcomponent1 ⊗ Ψcomponent2 ⊗ Ψcomponent3 ⊗ …

What this inequality means is that the quantum state of an entangled system contains information
over and above that of the quantum states of the components. The intrinsic properties of entangled
wholes do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of and spatiotemporal relations among their parts.

interpretations of quantum mechanics yield priority monism—if this is right, then restrict attention only to
worlds in which a priority monism-entailing interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct.
12 Note that grounding theorists who posit metaphysical grounding laws (e.g. Wilsch 2015) need not
requre this: there could be two worlds indiscernible from one another save that one has priority monist
grounding laws, and the other has priority partist grounding laws. Regardless of the plausibility of this sort
of metaphysics of grounding, my response to the objection does not rest on the existence of occult
grounding laws.
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In other words, if something is part of a quantum entangled system, then at least some of its
properties are necessitated by the properties of the whole system, and the properties of the whole system
are not necessitated by the properties of the parts of the system. Is a massively quantum entangled world
inconsistent with either physicalism or whole-world compositional mentality?
I believe that the answer is “no”, but this is a complicated issue. One might think that a massively
quantum entangled world is physically unacceptable because it entails the existence of strong emergent
properties. Strongly emergent properties are not necessitated by, nor a priori inferable from, the intrinsic
and spatiotemporal properties of a thing’s parts. Though some have argued that strong emergence of this
sort is incompatible with physicalism (Jackson 1998), it is not clear why it should be. After all, our best
physics says that the actual world contains quantum entangled systems (and it even might be massively
entangled, as Schaffer 2010 argues), and it is strange to think that physicalism could be made false just
for this reason. Because of this, it would be a misstep to assert that physicalism is inconsistent with the
mere existence of strongly emergent entangled properties (see also Papineau 2008, Brown and Montero
2018).
Whether quantum entanglement is consistent with compositional mentality is a thornier question.
Remember that compositional mentality is realized if relational properties of the parts of a system
necessitate mental properties for that system. If the properties of a whole quantum entangled system fail
to supervene on the properties of the parts of a quantum entangled system, then it seems that the
properties of a whole quantum entangled system cannot be identical to compositional mental properties.
Given how quantum entanglement is defined, this worry seems reasonable. However, rather than get into
the nitty gritty of the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, I would like to undercut this objection in a more
straightforward

way.

An actual human brain is quantum entangled system, but it nonetheless realizes compositional
mentality. This is because the mentality-relevant properties of a brain—like biological and chemical
properties of neurons—are not affected by quantum effects. As many have pointed out (e.g. Tegmark
2000, Jumper and Scholes 2014), the brain is too hot and wet for intrinsic quantum effects to make a
difference to its mentality-relevant operations. So, even though the brain is quantum entangled, its mental
properties are necessitated by the relational properties of its parts. Since the world I asked you to imagine
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in the last section contains a brain that is just like an actual-world brain, it too should be capable of
realizing compositional mentality, regardless of whether it is a quantum entangled system or not.
However, I must stress that this is a complex issue. There may be a flaw in my response—for
instance, perhaps it will turn out that human brains regularly employ quantum mechanical effects in their
operations (see Penrose 1989, 1994; Hameroff and Penrose 1996). Or perhaps there is some deeper
metaphysical problem that I am overlooking. Regardless, even if I am wrong on this, the overall point I am
endeavouring to prove remains correct. Consider the hungry AI world that I described in the last section.
Suppose that in a massively quantum entangled world, such an AI is incapable of realizing compositional
mentality—instead, its mentality is a strongly emergent property that is not necessitated by the relational
properties of the parts of the AI system (perhaps it is a quantum computer).
Possession of this sort of mentality by the AI is surely consistent with the truth of physicalism. Call
mentality that is identical to the emergent properties of a whole quantum entangled system “entangled
mentality”. If entangled mental properties depend on quantum mechanical laws which are not especially
suited to produce mentality, then those properties are not physically pernicious. And entangled mental
properties do depend on quantum entanglement laws which are not mentality-specific—these laws work
equally well to generate entangled non-mental systems, like tables and chairs. Compare entanglement
laws with the physically problematic psychophysical laws of Chalmers (1996), which exist just to
nomologically generate mental properties given appropriate physical conditions, and are incapable of
generating non-mental properties. Additionally, since brains are quantum entangled systems, it would
again be foolish for a physicalist to deem that the existence of entangled mentality should make
physicalism false.
Moving away from issues with quantum entanglement, an objector might take a different tack,
and assert that there are two sorts of fundamentality: priority partist fundamentality and priority monist
fundamentality. The No Fundamental Mentality thesis concerns only the former sort, so the possibility of
priority monist fundamental mentality does nothing to harm the thesis.
This sounds wrong to me. There seems to be only one sort of absolute (as opposed to relative)
fundamentality: some property is fundamental if it depends on nothing else. This is necessary and

33

sufficient for a property to count as fundamental, regardless of whether it a property of the smallest part or
the whole of nature.
However, for the sake of argument, suppose there really are two ultimately different kinds of
fundamentality. Does this meant that No Fundamental Mentality is off the hook? I think not: consider
Goff’s (2017) cosmopsychism. This is the view that the whole of nature possesses fundamental mentality,
but not because compositional mentality (or some other physically acceptable sort of mentality) is
realized. Rather, Goff’s view is somewhat similar to panpsychism, which says that the most
mereologically basic constituents of reality possess a primitive sort of mentality. Under consmopsychism,
the whole cosmos possesses a primitive and scientifically inexplicable sort of mentality, with the mentality
of the parts of the universe depending on the mentality of the whole.13
To rule out a view such as cosmopsychism, a “No Priority Monist Fundamental Mentality”
constraint must be posited in addition to the standard “No Priority Partist Fundamental Mentality”
constraint. Unfortunately, the new constraint makes the wrong ruling on worlds in the class which I have
been describing. So stipulating that priority monist fundamentality is distinct from priority partist
fundamentality does not help.
One might instead bite the bullet, and admit that physicalism is false in worlds such as those I
have described. After all, priority monism is weird, so why trust our intuitions about the conditions under
which physicalism is true in those worlds? It just turns out that our common sense leads us astray in
these cases.
This looks to me like the worst response: the bullet is quite big, with unexpected consequences
that I have already identified, such as a hungry AI making physicalism go from true to false in a world. It is
also clearly question begging: this objection just denies the conclusion of my argument without wrestling
with any of the premises. The objection is particularly bad because there seems to be nothing physically
unacceptable in the worlds I have described: priority monism is consistent with physicalism, and
13

Goff attaches cosmopsychism to a version of panpsychism, such that all of the components of the
whole also possess mentality. I don’t see why cosmopsychism and panpsychism must be linked, but
regardless, a different problem case can be contrived which combines the infinite descent of mentality
from the last section with the priority monist mentality of this section. This is a world which contains both
cosmos-level mentality (which is fundamental under priority monism) and mentality for all the parts of the
cosmos. Thus, if one were to object that the priority monist mentality I have described is different than the
priority monist mentality Goff describes, a truer analogue of Goff’s cosmopsychism can show up in the
world which combines priority monism with an infinite descent.

34

compositional mentality is consistent with physicalism, and it really looks as if the conjunction of priority
monism with compositional mentality ought to count as consistent with physicalism. The objection could
be given teeth if a good reason were given for why physicalism ought to count as false in these worlds.
However, I see no such good reason.
Finally, perhaps the No Fundamental Mentality proponent might admit that physicalism is true in
the worlds I have described, and true precisely because compositional mentality is realized in them. This
objector might urge that I have provided the solution to my own puzzle: what is needed is a more specific
account of physically acceptable versus physically unacceptable mentality, and compositional mentality
provides just such a condition. After all, what other sort of mentality could be consistent with physicalism?
Unfortunately, this doesn’t work: as I have already noted, compositional mentality is neither
necessary nor sufficient as an account of physically acceptable mentality. Russellian physicalist mentality
(Montero 2010, Brown 2017)—which says that phenomenally mental properties ultimately depend on
non-relational properties of the basic constituents of the world—seems to be a physically acceptable sort
of mentality. Yet it is inconsistent with compositional mentality: appropriate relational properties of the
parts of a system are not sufficient to necessitate Russellian physicalist mentality. If this is right, then
compositional mentality is not necessary in order to have physically acceptable mentality. Similarly, as I
explained already, necessitarian dualism is consistent with compositional mentality. So compositional
mentality is not sufficient for physically acceptable mentality either.
2.4. Conclusion
Though ‘physicalism’ is underdefined, nearly all philosophers agree that the existence of fundamental
mentality would make the view false, regardless of whatever else physicalism requires. I have presented
a challenge to this widely accepted attitude: fundamental mental properties could exist which should not
make physicalism false. What does this mean for our definition of physicalism?
I agree with those philosophers who think that physicalism should be made false by instantiation
of physically unacceptable mental properties. It is a social fact that most philosophers understand certain
views about e.g. consciousness to be inconsistent with physicalism. The problem is that characterizing
physically unacceptable mentality as mentality which is fundamental does not suffice—such an
articulation forces us to make the wrong ruling on a class of worlds that plausibly ought to count as
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physical. Some more sophisticated articulation of physically acceptable mentality needs to be given if
anything like the via negativa account, or a via negaitiva-plus-something-else account, is to work.
As yet, no such articulation has been offered. This is not a simple task: such an account of
physically acceptable mentality must rule out views like necessitarian dualism, and include views like
Russellian physicalism. I do not yet have a positive view to offer as aid for via negativa physicalists.
Nonetheless, I expect that there is a way to articulate the difference between physically acceptable and
physically unacceptable mentality in a way that does not simply appeal to fundamentality, and that this
can be used by via negativa physicalists as an improved version of their view. Now the hard work has to
be done to articulate such an account of the mental.
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II. The Hope and Horror of Physicalism

Philosophers’ passions are frequently aroused by arguments physicalism. Though physicalism stands as
orthodoxy in analytic philosophy, claiming to be the metaphysical position that best suits our scientific
age, one might wonder why anyone other than an analytic philosopher should care about the thesis. After
all, the undeniable success of science is independent from the truth of physicalism, and nothing of
obvious consequence to non-philosophers appears to stand or fall with the view.
In contrast with this deflationary attitude, physicalism can be considered as an existential
condition, which is a state of affairs that is relevantly related to the existential question ‘should I live given
condition x?’14 The relevance relation is one of commonsense intelligibility: if it makes sense to ask the
existential question for some particular condition x, then that condition is existential. ‘Should I live given
that yellow is not my favorite color?’ would probably not count as plausible by anyone’s standards,
whereas ‘should I live given that everyone I love has died and I am suffering from late-stage Alzheimer's?’
would for just about everyone. Existential conditions come in two varieties: positive conditions, which
prima facie lend themselves to an affirmative answer to the existential question, and negative conditions,
which lend themselves to a negative answer. For instance, the claim that ‘human life is brief and full of
suffering in an absurd universe’ seems prima facie to lend itself to a negative answer, and it makes sense
to question the value of continued personal existence given that condition. Alternately, ‘I am happy,
healthy and wise’ lends itself to a positive answer.
There are several consequences of physicalism that appear to have existential import. On one
hand, the view seems to be inconsistent with a number of things that many people find personally
valuable, like the existence of normatively-laden laws of nature such as karma, the existence of a divine
being such as God, the existence of an immortal soul, an ultimate teleological purpose to the universe or
individual life, or the possibility of free will in a robust sense. On the other hand, physicalism also seems
to have some positive existential implications, such as there being no limit to our potential scientific

This is an attempt at articulating the concern of Albert Camus when he says: “There is but one truly
serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to
answering the fundamental question of philosophy”(1957, pg. 1). I admit that there may be alternative
ways to precisify the notion of an existential condition, but all such precisifications hopefully deem moreor-less the same things as existentially relevant.
14
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understanding of the world, or support for the Epicurean attitude that we need not fear supernatural
powers or forces of any sort (since they don’t exist). So at first pass, physicalism looks like it could be
either a positive or a negative existential condition, depending on which of its consequences one focuses
on.15
However, whether physicalism really counts as an existential condition depends on the precise
definition of ‘physicalism’, since the view is widely acknowledged to have a range of plausible
interpretations. This determines which of the above existentially relevant consequences of physicalism
really are consequences of physicalism. Are all versions of physicalism really inconsistent with the
existence of robust free will, an immortal soul, God, ultimate purpose and human-centric laws of nature?
Do they all support our scientific-imperialist hopes and allay our fears of supernatural forces?
I will focus on two relatively popular ways of understanding ‘physicalism’: the via negativa
approach (Spurrett and Papinueau 1999, Levine 2001, Montero 2005, Montero and Papineau 2005,
Worley 2006) which understands ‘physical’ to mean ‘not fundamentally mental or fundamentally
normative’; and the theory-based approach (Smart 1978; Melnyc 1997, 2002), which says that something
is physical if it is referred to by our best physics. Unfortunately, my task is complicated by flaws that have
been identified with both approaches. As I discussed in the previous section of this dissertation, via
negativa physicalism underspecifies the meaning of ‘mental’, such that it cannot distinguish between
“physicalism friendly” sorts of mentality and “physicalism unfriendly” sorts, which leads to apparently
wrong rulings on certain classes of worlds as being physical or not. The theory-based approach faces
Hempel’s (1949, 1969) well-known dilemma: if ‘physics’ refers to current physics, then physicalism is
false, since we know that current physics is not complete. If ‘physics’ refers to future or ideal physics, then
physicalism is vague to the point of meaninglessness, or trivially true if ideal physics refers to any
fundamental thing that could possibly exist (including paradigmatically non-physical things like God or
Cartesian souls).
15

This list of the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism is different from what philosophers
typically identify as the significant consequences of physicalism. For instance, Barry Loewer (2001)
identifies fear of prioritizing physics over other sciences, reduction of everything to physics-level
properties, issues about mental causation, and the threat of elimination of the mental as the prima facie
scary consequences of physicalism. My list does not include any of these, since I think these are not
issues most non-philosophers are gripped by. I also think Loewer is quite right that physicalism does not
have these consequences—so even if people would be concerned (if properly informed about the matter)
about e.g. the elimination of mentality under physicalism, the fear is ultimately unfounded.
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I will argue that further precisification is required in order to assess whether the aforementioned
existential consequences of physicalism are genuine consequences. I will offer some suggestions for the
theory-based account, and provide a way to temporarily avoid the issues with via negativa physicalism.
Specifically, while the via negativa might eventually relieve its woes by determining more precisely what
counts as “physicalism friendly” mentality, here I will bracket off the classes of problematic worlds that the
current formulation of via negativa makes the wrong ruling on. Theory-based physicalism might avoid the
vagueness/trivial truth horn of Hempel’s dilemma by specifying the essence of scientific practice.
Finally, I will show that via negativa physicalism entails all (or nearly all) of the negative existential
conditions identified above, and theory-based physicalism entails nearly none of them (but is nonetheless
consistent with them). The positive existential conditions are split: theory-based physicalism satisfies our
scientific hope to potentially conquer all of nature (in understanding at least), and via negativa largely
abolishes the fear of supernatural forces as controllers of human destiny. Even though via negativa
physicalism carries the weight of negative existential terror with it, this is not meant to be a knock against
the view: this just means that the via negativa is a metaphysics that would have us confront reality without
the artificial support of life-affirming myths.
I will proceed as follows. Section one irons out issues with the two popular ways to understand
physicalism, and the following sections determine what the existential consequences of those two
versions of physicalism are. I’ll conclude by offering some thoughts about what physicalism’s existential
consequences mean for us and mean for theory selection in contemporary metaphysics.
1. Two Notions of the Physical
There is a hurdle to overcome in advance of applying the notion of an existential condition to physicalism:
the two popular ways to define ‘physicalism’—theory-based physicalism and via negativa—each has its
own set of definitional issues.16 Here I’ll explicate these issues in more detail, and offer some ways to
patch each.

Additional ways to understand ‘physicalism’ have been proposed, for instance Ney’s (2008) view that
physicalism is an attitude rather than a metaphysical thesis, or Stoljar’s (2001) “object physicalism” which
says that all of the fundamental properties that exist are properties of prototypical physical objects.
However, I take it that metaphysical accounts of physicalism are far more popular than Ney’s physicalismas-attitude view, and in footnote ten of Stoljar’s (2001) Two Conceptions of the Physical paper he admits
that object physicalism ultimately collapses to via negativa physicalism. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
me to focus on theory-based and via negativa physicalism as the two standard interpretations.
16
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As I already pointed out in the historical preliminaries and in the previous section, Carl Hempel
saw that theory-based physicalism, which ties ‘physical’ to ‘physics’, is too ambiguous to be of any use: it
gives us a view that is trivially false, hopelessly vague, or trivially true. One might think that via negativa
physicalism is safe from ambiguity-related issues, but also in the last section I identified a definitional
problem for via negativa: there are worlds that intuitively ought to count as entirely physical, yet via
negativa physicalism makes the wrong ruling on them. As I already explained, these are infinitely
decomposable worlds with an infinite descent of mental properties, or priority monist worlds with cosmosspanning mental properties.
These are serious problems for both theory-based and via negativa physicalism, and I do not
pretend to have perfectly satisfactory solutions to them. However, I have in mind some some stopgap
measures, and hopefully they prove good enough to allow me to move on to a discussion of the specific
existentially relevant consequences of the two popular versions of physicalism. In brief, I believe idealtheory-based physicalism can be made less vague by specifying the essence of scientific inquiry in
physics, and that via negativa physicalism can (for now) avoid its problems by bracketing off the classes
of possible worlds that it makes the wrong ruling in. Again, though, these are merely stopgap measures.
Starting with theory-based physicalism: the ideal physics horn of Hempel’s dilemma is troubling
because we have no idea what ideal physics is like, and if we specify it to simply mean a physics of
everything, then physicalism is trivially true—no good! However, both the vagueness and triviality
problems of this horn can be avoided if the essence of physics is defined. There are many ways one
might do this, but being overly fine-grained is inadvisable since (i) we don’t want to recommit the mistake
of materialism and too specifically define the nature of the scientifically-discernable world from an
armchair, and (ii) scientific practice is extremely diverse, and a description that is too fine-grained is liable
to leave something out.
My suggestions for theory-based physicalism are the following.17

17

There might be other ways to go with a specification of ideal physics, but the ones I am aware of have
serious flaws. For instance, perhaps Chalmers’ (1996) understanding of ideal physics as quantifying over
all and only structural and dispositional properties might work to avoid vagueness and triviality. The
problem with this view is that it commits the physicalist to the unlikely position that the universe is nothing
but structure and disposition all the way down, with no categorical role-fillers of any kind at the bottom of
nature. Notice that this is different than the more popular and plausible view called “dispositional
essentialism”, which says that categorical properties have their dispositional roles essentially. The
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Law constraint: all events are law-governed in worlds where physicalism is true
Capacity constraint: there is nothing that is in principle beyond the scientific grasp of beings with
the equivalent of human cognitive and perceptual capacities in worlds where physicalism is true
The law constraint says nothing about the metaphysics of laws of nature: they can be either
Humean or non-Humean, and explained modally or otherwise. It is rather a mere commitment to the
existence of lawful or law-like regularities in nature which govern all events. These regularities can be
fully causally determined by antecedent events—as in classical physics—or underdetermined by
antecedent events—as seems to be the case in quantum physics. If the latter, the causally
underdetermined events must still be law-governed: events must have well-defined probabilistic
outcomes, and cannot be completely random. This gives a sufficient-for-false condition for theory-based
physicalism: if there are any non-law-governed events in a world, then physicalism is false in that world.
One might worry that I am reversing the standard way of articulating nomological versus other
sorts of possibility. Typically, something is thought to be nomologically possible if it is allowed relative to
the lawful constraints that physics specifies. Here, though, I am defining ideal physics relative to
nomological possibility, which seems to put the horse before the cart. Is this a serious problem? I think
not: by “law-governed” I merely mean that there is some constraint on what can happen in a world which
is narrower than metaphysical or logical constraint, and that this constraint is specifiable in a general way.
The constraint that e.g. ‘event e cannot occur in place p at time t’ is too specific to count as a law of this
sort—constraints which are temporally or spatially indexed to particular times or places are thus ruled out.
The capacity constraint says that an ideal physics relative to human cognitive and perceptual
capacities is an account of everything that exists in some world. This is supposed to capture the scientific
imperialist spirit of physicalism that there is nothing which is in principle unobtainable by our scientific
grasp. It follows from this constraint that if theory-based physicalism is true, then we are not cognitively or
perceptually closed from a complete understanding of the natural world. Note that the capacity constraint
does not require that there must really be intelligent beings in a world in order for physicalism to be true in
that world: the “in principle” in the constraint is there to avoid this conclusion. It is sufficient that all of the

structure-only view is not without adherents—e.g. Ladyman (1998)—but it seems unfair to force this view
on a physicalist as a matter of definition. The way of cashing out ideal-physics physicalism that I provide
is not without problems, but so far as I can see it is the most viable articulation that has yet been given.
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things in a world be within the theoretical grasp of beings who are cognitively and perceptual constrained
as we are, regardless of whether there really are any such beings in that world to do the grasping.
While there might be some issues,18 these two constraints help ideal-physics physicalism avoid
the vagueness horn of Hempel’s dilemma, since we know what it means for an event to be law-governed,
and we seem to roughly know the limit of human cognitive and perceptual capacities (as revealed by
cognitive science).19 Neither is this sort of physicalism trivially true: again, a completely random or
uncaused event would make this ideal-physics physicalism false, as would the existence of anything
which is in principle not scientifically discernable by beings like us.
The issue with via negativa physicalism is a bit more complex. The problem is that via negativa
says physicalism is false if there is fundamental mentality or an infinite descent of mentality, but does not
make a distinction between sorts of mentality that are physically acceptable versus sorts that are
unacceptable. As I pointed out, there are worlds in which physicalism is plausibly true, yet in which there
is an infinite descent of mentality (an infinite descent of functionalist or identity theoretic mentality) or
there is fundamental mentality (a priority monist world containing only a brain). I suspect that this problem
might eventually be fixed by giving an account of “physicalism-friendly” mentality, which will allow us to
distinguish worlds containing physically unacceptable mentality from worlds containing physically
acceptable mentality. However, for now I have a less ambitious strategy in mind: bracketing off the
problematic possible worlds.
18

An obvious issue: there are things that seem physically kosher, yet would make this theory-based
physicalism false. For instance, imagine a substance that is in most respects just like the substance which
composes humans and stars and planets, but which cannot at all causally interact with us or things like
us. Since it would not causally interact with us or our instruments, we would be perceptually closed from
knowledge of this substance. Ought the existence of such causally isolated stuff make physicalism false
in a world? I am not sure: perhaps it should, if the spirit of physicalism is the spirit of of scientific conquest
over all of nature. This is clearly a problem for the view, but I suspect it will remain so for any version of
theory-based physicalism.
19 I admit that ‘human cognitive and perceptual capacities’ is a bit vague. In a criticism of McGinn’s (1989)
mysterianism about consciousness, Dennett (1991) says: “His thesis about the likely limitations of our
brains would be uncontroversially true if it weren't for our clever trick of expanding the powers of our
naked brains by off-loading much of the work to artifacts we have designed and built just for this purpose.
The brains we were born with are no doubt quite incapable of grasping long division—let alone calculus
or photosynthesis—without the aid of pencil and paper or chalk and blackboard.” In other words, our
capacities are obviously enhanced through tool use, and who knows what the upper limit of tool use is? It
gets even worse if extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998) considerations are brought in, and our
capacity-enhancing tools are sometimes parts of our minds. Nonetheless, it seems to me that humans
must have some innate cognitive and perceptual limitations, regardless of what tools we employ, and that
we can at least roughly discern our own cognitive and perceptual limits.
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Rather than refine via negativa physicalism, I will leave it as the thesis that there is no
fundamental mentality or normativity. Worlds that are infinitely decomposable or in which priority monism
is true are—for present purposes—to be bracketed off. In the subsequent assessment of the existential
consequences of physicalism, I will not consider worlds in those classes. As I said, this is merely a
stopgap measure, but hopefully will do in this context—until someone comes up with an improved version
of via negativa physicalism, with an adequate explanation of the difference between physically acceptable
and physically unacceptable mentality, the present notion is the only one available.
Now, equipped with patched up versions of theory-based and via negativa physicalism, I can
engage in the project of determining the existentially relevant consequences of physicalism. I will do this
by progressively moving through the list of prima facie existentially relevant consequences of physicalism
that I earlier identified—that physicalism is inconsistent with the existence of robust free will, God, an
immortal soul, ultimate purpose, and normatively-laden laws of nature like karma; and that physicalism
entails that we need not fear supernatural powers and can in principle know everything scientifically—in
order to determine which of these really are consequences of the two notions of physicalism under
consideration.
2.1 Free will
There are robust and non-robust senses of ‘free will’—the robust sense corresponds to “libertarian”
accounts of free will and the non-robust sense corresponds to “compatibilist” accounts. Here I am only
concerned with libertarian accounts, which all take free will to be incompatible with causal determinism,
such that any world in which determinism is true is a world which can contain no persons with free will.
Libertarians generally think that, at minimum, a person who possesses free will must be able to do
otherwise than perform some actions that she actually performs. Compatibilism, which is consistent with
causal determinism, and often defines free will in terms of an agent’s capacity to satisfy one or another of
her desires (sometimes her “deep” desires—see Frankfurt 1971, Wolf 1987), seems to not be at all
problematic under any version of physicalism (assuming that physicalism does not entail radical
eliminativism about desires or agents). However, many people intuitively feel that something of existential
importance is lost if only a compatibilist notion of free will is true, so here I will examine whether libertarian
free will could possibly exist in a world that is entirely physical.
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Libertarian theories of free will fall into one of three general categories: noncausal (e.g. Ginet
1989), event-causal (e.g. Mele 1996) and agent-causal (e.g. Chisholm 1976, Clarke 1993). Noncausal
accounts do not give a positive causal requirement for free will, but rather say that possession of free will
depends on satisfaction of something other than a causal condition (like realization of “actish”
phenomenology) along with satisfaction of negative causal conditions (like causal underdetermination).
Event-causal accounts combine features of compatibilism—for instance, that freedom requires an action
be caused by the person’s deeply held convictions—and add that a free action must be
nondeterministically caused. The free agent’s actions must have the appropriate causal relationship to the
agent’s beliefs and desires, and the agent must have been able to have done otherwise. Agent-causal
libertarianism says that an agent has free will if she is at least sometimes the ultimate causal source of
her actions.
I find Derk Pereboom’s (2014) “vanishing agent” argument against non-agent-causal libertarian
accounts of free will to be quite persuasive. The gist of it is as follows: if the agent is not the ultimate
causal source of her actions, then we cannot hold her responsible for what she does. Rather, non-agent
causes would be responsible for the agent’s actions.20 Libertarian theories of free will are supposed to
track responsibility of the agent, so non-agent-causal accounts of free will are not really libertarian
accounts of free will at all.
Whether or not this vanishing agent argument ultimately succeeds, I will here focus on agentcausal accounts of free will, since such accounts more obviously express our intuitions about free will in
the robust sense. I take it that agent-causal accounts require that the agent be fundamental: if the agent’s
actions are fully determined by properties of non-agentive things—like the events that comprise the
neural activity of her brain—then the agent is not the ultimate causal source of her actions. Though a
decision-making event can be caused by a non-agent thing—e.g. something in the agent’s environment
may cause a disjuctive decision-making event ‘decide action A or action B’ to occur—the final event must

20

Pereboom is specifically interested in cases involving an agent who has conflicting interests which are
in equipoise, such that her e.g. moral desires and self-interested desires are at odds and are perfectly
balanced. In these cases, an action cannot be performed on the grounds that it better fulfills whatever the
agent’s stronger interests are. On non-agent-causal accounts of free will, the action in these cases will
ultimately be caused by something non-agential.
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be caused by the agent: causal indeterminacy in a decision event must be ultimately “resolved” (for lack
of a better word) by the agent. Is this account of free will consistent with both notions of physicalism?
2.2 Free will and via negativa
Agent-causal accounts of free will seem very clearly inconsistent with via negativa physicalism: agents
are mental, and agent-causal free will requires that agents be fundamental, so agent-causal accounts of
free will entail that there is fundamental mentality. But perhaps that is too fast—is it possible for an agentcausal account of free will to be satisfied without the agent being fundamental? If so, then there is some
possible world in which via negativa physicalism is true and which contains agent-causal free will.
Suppose that the agent is the brain—a high-level, complex system of neurons that does not
depend on lower-level mental things. Also suppose that causal indeterminism is true, and further that
brain events at least sometimes are causally underdetermined—such that it is not determined in advance
whether e.g. brain event A or brain event B will occur at time t. In the actual world, this might happen if
brain events directly involve subatomic properties, inheriting causal indeterminacy from those properties
(e.g. Penrose 1989). Since the agent is identical to the brain, and the brain is causally underdetermined,
does this mean that such an agent might possess agent-causal free will?
No: if the agent is the ultimate causal source of her actions, then causal indeterminacy must be
resolved by the agent. Indeterminacy cannot be probabilistically resolved by chance or some other nonagent phenomenon. In the brain case, wherein quantum effects produce underdetermined events, the
underdetermined cause resolves into a specific effect at the level of fundamental physics—which is not
within the agent’s power to control, unless the agent is also fundamental. Given this, it seems that via
negativa physicalism really is inconsistent with the existence of agent-causal free will.
2.3 Free will and theory-based physicalism
Theory-based physicalism seems to be consistent with agent-causal free will. Ideal physics as I have
defined it allows for fundamental mentality as well as causal indeterminacy. Combined, these seem
sufficient to allow an agent to at least sometimes be the ultimate causal source of her actions—perhaps
fundamental agents could exercise ultimate causal responsibility via wave function collapse, or something
similar. But doesn’t my version of theory-based physicalism require the existence of laws of nature, and
robust free will require that some events not be constrained by natural law?
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No: robust, agent-causal libertarian free will does not require that free actions are entirely
unconstrained by laws. This view just requires that the agent is sometimes the ultimate causal source of
her actions. The decision event can have a probabilistic structure, which may be well defined. Of course,
there may be worlds containing agent-causal free will in which decision-making events are entirely
uncaused, and not limited by even probabilistic laws of nature. Theory-based physicalism cannot be true
in those worlds, but this does not mean that no theory-based physical world contains agent-causal free
will. So theory-based physicalism is at least consistent with agent-causal free will—and thus is not
existentially terrifying in this regard.
3.1 God
Across history and culture, there have been a staggering number of different ideas about the nature of
God—even within Christianity, notions of God are diverse. I cannot consider all such notions of God; for
present purposes I will understand ‘God’ to refer to an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being of
pure spirit, who created the universe. Of course, given the diversity of views about the nature of God, this
notion of God will not satisfy everyone. For instance, some believe that God is a necessarily existing
being (Kripke 1980), or that God exists outside of space and time (Hart 2013). However, a notion of God
without these exotic properties is, I think, robust enough to count as God by most people’s lights.
Additionally, there have been thousands of years of philosophical and theological debate about
how the properties of God ought to be properly understood. My interest is in determining whether a being
who bears all of these properties could exist in an entirely physical world, but not every property of God is
relevant to this interest. Here it will suffice to gloss the precise meanings of these terms, unless one
appears to be inconsistent with either via negativa or theory-based physicalism. It goes without saying
that many people find existential comfort in God, and, as Nietzsche (1887/1974, §125) says, would find
themselves “plunging continually … [b]ackward, sideward, in all directions” as if lost in an endless
expanse of space, if deprived of the reassuring presence of a divine being.
3.2 God and via negativa physicalism
If God is defined as a being of “pure spirit”, and this means that God is fundamentally mental, then God
trivially cannot exist in a world in which via negativa physicalism is true. Since it seems natural to interpret
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“pure spirit” as “fundamentally mental”, it easily follows that God could not be physical in the via negativa
sense.
But this is too easy. Remember that I am interested in the existentially relevant consequences of
physicalism. Perhaps what is existentially relevant here is not whether a being of pure spirit exists, but
whether a being who instantiates all the other properties commonly attributed to God exists. Suppose
theological leaders were to come to the conclusion—and disseminate to their flocks—the idea that God
exists, and is the all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good creator of the universe, but that God is not a
being of pure spirit. Rather, God’s mentality is non-fundamental: perhaps God is a cosmic spacebrain
floating around between the galaxies, or a background energy force spread throughout the universe with
a mind which depends on the interactions of God’s infinitely many energy fields, or a higher-dimensional
being who has a nature that we cannot fully comprehend, but is nonetheless not fundamentally mental.
Would anyone find the mere fact that God is physical in this sense to be a reason for despair?
This is a bit tricky. Historically speaking, theists have sometimes gotten rather hung up on
seemingly minor details pertaining to their religious beliefs, like the disagreement between Protestants
and Catholics on whether to understand the wine in the Eucharist ritual as literally transformed into the
blood of Christ. Perhaps there are some theists out there who are personally or ideologically committed to
the existence of a God of pure spirit. Perhaps they even feel so strongly about this bit of doctrine to
consider its denial heresy, and might even consider life less worthy of living if the doctrine were false.
However, such an attitude strikes me as irrational. It seems that via negativa physicalism is
consistent with all the other properties of God. That is, the nonexistence of a being of pure spirit in a world
does not seem to entail that the world could not contain a being who is all-powerful and all-knowing and
so forth. So, while a God of pure spirit could not exist in a world where via negativa physicalism is true, it
seems that a non-pure-spirit God could exist. And it is these other properties of God that a person might
reasonably derive existential significance from: God as creator and maintainer of the world’s moral order,
who pays attention to and loves all of us. It seems that a person should derive just as much comfort from
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the existence of a being who can do all this, yet who is not a substance of pure spirit. The “pure spirit” bit,
in my eyes, does no real existential work.21
However, one might object that there is a tighter relationship between the various properties of
God than I have been suggesting. Perhaps God could not be e.g. perfectly good or the creator of the
universe unless God is also a being of pure spirit. Let’s look at the details of how this response might
work.
Does God-as-creator depend on God-as-fundamentally-mental? Here is a reason to think so: the
cosmological argument for the existence of God roughly says that all physical things have a cause. I take
it this is because it is inconceivable for there to be an endless backward chain of causes without
beginning (put aside the plausibility of this premise and take it as a supposition of the argument). So the
universe must have been caused by something nonphysical: a being of pure spirit, under the via negativa
reading.
The word “physical” clearly does lots of work in this argument. If the main premise were to simply
say that all things full-stop must have a cause, then we would need to explain the existence of God as
well. God’s nonphysicality offers an out: since God is a fundamentally different sort of thing than the
physical universe, we can explain God as always existing or being self-creating, which are (apparently)
not options available to explain the origin of the physical universe.
Unfortunately, this argument is quite obviously ad hoc in a bad way: why should it make any
different whether God is fundamentally mental or not to the sort of explanation we can give for God’s
origin versus the origin of the universe? It doesn’t look to me to make any difference whether something
is fundamentally mental relative to its capacity to have always existed or be self-creating. Perhaps the
move appeared more compelling to theists of the past because “physical” and “pure spirit” were

This points to an ambiguity inherent to my overall project: it is not clear whether ‘existential condition’ is
merely descriptive, or whether there is an additional normative component. If the former—for instance if
the term just refers to what some population finds existentially significant—then I cannot criticize theists
who have an existential commitment to the existence of a being of pure spirit. If the latter, then it seems I
must provide a more robust account of which existential concerns are reasonable and which are not—a
project which I doubt could be satisfactorily accomplished. While I acknowledge this as a problematic
dilemma, and I don’t have a solution, I nevertheless don’t think it damns my whole project. I am mostly
using ‘existential condition’ in the purely descriptive way, which seems unproblematic. When I venture
into normative territory, as in the discussion of a God of “pure spirit”, I am relying on normative intuitions
about what is a reasonable existential concern, rather than a more substantial theory of the normative
side of ‘existential condition’.
21

48

underdefined. However, once the ambiguity is removed, it becomes clear that there is no significant
connection between being the creator of the universe and being fundamentally mental.
What about God’s omniscience? One might think that in order for God to know everything, God
must have a mind that can store an infinite amount of information, and that no physical vessel can suffice.
Only a fundamentally mental storage medium, which is not limited by constraints of the non-mental
universe, could suffice.
Again, upon inspection this falls apart. There is nothing in the notion of fundamental mentality
which says anything about information storage capacity. A fundamentally mental being might have a
limited storage capacity, and a non-fundamentally mental being might have an infinite storage capacity
(as in an infinite universe, for instance). So there is no conceptual link between omniscience and
fundamental mentality.
Does God need to be a being of pure spirit in order to be perfectly good? It seems not: one might
act in the best possible way regardless of whether one possesses fundamental mentality or not. However,
here it gets a bit trickier for via negativa physicalism, since this is additionally the view that there is no
fundamental normativity.
Could God be morally perfect if there are no fundamental norms? This depends on what “morally
perfect” means. If “morally perfect” is defined relative to anything non-fundamental, like a set of social
conventions or perhaps rules built into rational thinking, then of course God could be morally perfect in a
world in which via negativa physicalism is true. But if a being can only be morally perfect if norms are
fundamental, then God could not exist in this world. I’ll note two things: (i) the commitments of via
negativa can in principle be broken off from one another, such that there might be a version of via
negativa which is consistent with God and another which is inconsistent; and (ii) this is a tricky area of
metaethics upon which (so far as I can tell) there is little-to-no agreement. So staking the inconsistency of
via negativa and God upon the via negativa inconsistency with fundamental norms may not be wise for a
via negativa physicalist of the atheist persuasion.
Finally, how about God’s omnipotence? Need God be a being of pure spirit in order to be all
powerful? Here is a reason to think “no”: a world that does not contain fundamental mentality need not be
constrained by anything like the laws of physics. God might exist in a world in which God can do anything
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that is metaphysically possible, which seems to be consistent with via negativa. However, there are two
wrinkles with this.
One wrinkle is that fundamental mentality and fundamental normativity cannot exist in a world in
which via negativa physicalism is true, so God seems to be prevented from creating fundamental mental
or normative things. However, it is not quite true that this is a limit on God’s power: perhaps God could
create Cartesian souls, but decides for whatever reason not to. In such a case, the via negativa constraint
on physicalism is not broken—via negativa physicalists typically admit that physicalism is a contingent
thesis, and that it is possible for physicalism to be false in worlds which add the wrong things to what
exists in our world. The capacity of God to create such “wrong” things seems not enough to make via
negativa false in that world as via negativa is normally stated, but it is worth thinking about whether the
mere capacity for a world to contain fundamental mentality is sufficient for via negativa to be false in that
world—perhaps a modification to the view is in order.
The other wrinkle has to do with what I already said about free will. I said that robust free will is
inconsistent with via negativa physicalism: robust free will is agent-causal free will, and agent-causal free
will requires fundamental agents. Now: if God is all powerful, then shouldn’t God be capable of acting with
free will in the robust sense? And if so, doesn’t God’s omnipotence require that God be a fundamental
agent, thereby violating via negativa?
This is a bit thorny. As I pointed out, via negativa is in principle consistent with anything
whatsoever happening in a world, except the creation of fundamental mentality or normativity. So (nearly)
any of God’s desires can be satisfied without violating via negativa. By my standards, this suffices to
make God all-powerful and free, but perhaps I have compatibilist intuitions that are muddying things up.
Since I admit that robust free will is inconsistent with via negativa, it follows that—if you think that God’s
omnipotence requires free will of this sort—a fully all-powerful God could not exist in a via negativa world.
Nonetheless, it looks to me like this is not sufficient to rule that God (as typically thought of) is
inconsistent with via negativa physicalism: God can still be the creator of the universe, perfectly good,
know everything, and capable of causing any event to occur (except creation of fundamental mentality or
normativity).
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Thus, even upon further reflection, it looks like via negativa physicalism does not have the
negative existential consequence that God could not exist. The truth of via negativa would merely mean
that only a slightly less robust sort of God could exist than the one that theists normally consider—but
such a physical God is one who could plausibly satisfy all of the existential concerns which the fullblooded, pure spirit God satisfies.
3.3 God and theory-based physicalism
Could God exist in a world containing only the posits of an ideal physics? I think the answer is plausibly
“no”: various of the properties I have attributed to God are strongly in tension with theory-based
physicalism as I have described it. Remember that theory-based physicalism has two commitments: (i)
the universe is law governed and (ii) ideal physics is constrained relative to human cognitive and
perceptual capacities.
If God can do anything, then God can act in a non-law-governed way: God could do things that
would otherwise be prohibited by the normal laws of nature, and we would not be able to predict what
would happen during those events, even probabilistically. This conflicts with (i). Further, if God knows
everything, then God might plausibly have knowledge that surpasses human understanding—God might
have e.g. mathematical knowledge that is outside our ability to comprehend. And again, as an allpowerful being, God might be capable of performing actions that are beyond human understanding.
These considerations violate (ii).
There may also be an additional issue with God as the ultimate causal source of the universe:
perhaps we are cognitively closed from understanding how God could create the world from nothing. On
top of this, it seems that a world-creating event cannot be constrained by the laws of a world, since the
world’s laws only exist once the world has come into existence. Thus, many of the core properties of God
seem to be in tension with theory-based physicalism.
I think these many tensions are irresolvable: God could not exist in a world in which theory-based
physicalism is true. Unlike via negativa physicalism, the properties of God that are in tension with this
version of physicalism are the properties that are existentially significant: God as an all-powerful and allknowing creator of the universe. So, while both notions of physicalism I am considering are strictly
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speaking inconsistent with the existence of God, only theory-based physicalism has the full negative
existential significance of atheism attached to it.
4.1 Immortal soul
I will interpret “immortal soul” in a Cartesian way: this is a mental thing that a person is identical to and
which interacts with the body to cause behavior. An immortal soul cannot be destroyed once it has come
into existence. If one thinks that personal identity depends on certain psychological properties of a
person—like her personality or memories—then the immortal soul must also be the vehicle for personalidentity-determining psychological properties, since the person is identical to the soul. Obviously, many
religious people are existentially interested in the existence of an immortal soul, such that they would
likely feel that life is less worth living if the soul does not exist.
4.2 Immortal soul and via negativa physicalism
This is looks like the easiest existential consequence of physicalism to figure out: via negativa
physicalism is straightforwardly inconsistent with the existence of an immortal soul, since souls are
fundamental and mental. However, as in the God case, there is a further question: could something like a
soul exist, which satisfies the same existential concerns as that of an immortal soul, yet which is not a
fundamentally mental thing? As with God, I think the answer is “yes”.
Imagine some persons in a computer simulation: the world as they know it, and they themselves,
are computer programs running on digital computers. Suppose that when a person in this virtual world
“dies”—as when her “body” is “destroyed” in the virtual environment—her mind is not destroyed. Instead,
a new avatar body is created for that mind, which the person uses to continue to engage with the virtual
world. The persons in this simulation world are effectively immortal until the computer is turned off—and if
the computer is never turned off (which is a possibility consistent with via negativa physicalism), then they
live forever.
These digital people do not have immortal souls in the Cartesian sense: their mentality is not
fundamental, but rather the product of sophisticated operations performed by lower-level computational
hardware. Though they do not truly have immortal souls, are the same existential concerns satisfied as
those which would be satisfied by possession of immortal souls? I think so.
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From the perspective of these digital people, nothing would be different if a fundamental soul
were doing the work to keep them in existence. The realizer for their minds—computer hardware, in this
case—continues to exist even after the destruction of their perceptible “bodies”. These persons need not
fear death of the body. This, I think, is what is really existentially at stake with regard to an immortal soul.
Thus, though via negativa technically is inconsistent with the existence of an immortal soul, the view
nonetheless does not have a corresponding negative existential weight. This is because we can satisfy
the soul-concern even if we do not properly have souls.22
4.3 Immortal soul and theory-based physicalism
Could an immortal soul exist in a world in which theory-based physicalism is true? I think so: such a world
could last forever, and there could be fundamental mentality in that world. Souls could operate in a lawful
way, and the way they work could be completely transparent to human scientific scrutiny—thus satisfying
the two conditions I posited for theory-based physicalism. So, as I see it, theory-based physicalism is
straightforwardly consistent with the existence of immortal souls, and people existentially concerned with
the existence of an immortal soul need not fear this form of physicalism.
5.1 Ultimate purpose
The topic of “ultimate purpose” is somewhat more nebulous than the others I’ve so-far discussed: analytic
philosophers have not devoted a considerable amount of effort to determining what it means for a person
or the universe to have ultimate purpose. The small amount that has been written on this is largely
religious, such that ultimate purpose is derived from the dictates of God (e.g. Affolter 2007) or from the
essential nature of the soul (e.g. Tolstoy 1884/2010, Craig 1994). Here I will assume that ultimate
purpose need not be determined by religious entities of this sort.
By “ultimate purpose” I mean the following: someone or something has ultimate purpose if (i) the
person or thing ought to have some property or properties, (ii) that property or those properties confer
positive value to the possessor, and (iii) the “ought” does not ground in anything more fundamental. In
other words, if there is a way that a person or thing should be in order to be valuable, and this normative
22

One might worry that via negativa seems to require that we exist in a computer simulation in order for
us to have souls, which might be independently existentially unsettling. However, this is not the case: a
similar situation is possible if our minds were stored on indestructible vehicles, which grows or gets
attached to a new body after the death of its last host body. And there are surely other ways to realize
pseudo-immortal souls. So via negativa does not have the negative existential consequence that if we
have immortal souls (or pseudo-souls), then we are denizens of a computer simulation.
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fact is not explainable nor reducible to anything non-normative (like a non-normative evolutionary or
social fact), then that person or thing has an ultimate purpose. This means that subjectivist accounts of
the meaning of life, for instance Frankfurt (1982), do not count as providing an account of the ultimate
purpose of life, since these accounts typically deny ultimate human-psychology-independent facts about
normativity or value. Only “objectivist” (Metz 2013) accounts of life’s meaning or purpose, such as in Wolf
(1997), Nozick (1981), or Railton (1984), seem consistent with the criteria I have provided.
Notice that under this definition, not every value-conferring property is sufficient to confer ultimate
purpose. Suppose that having a pleasurable life is value-conferring, but that there is no fundamental norm
that dictates a person ought to live a pleasurable life. In this case, having pleasure may make a person’s
life better, but not imbue it with purpose. Alternately, if it is true that a person ought to live in accordance
with her true nature, or ought to be a moral person, and these properties confer value on the person, and
the ought claim is not explained by more fundamental non-normative properties, then these properties are
sufficient to give a person ultimate purpose.
5.2 Ultimate purpose and via negativa physicalism
As I have defined it, ultimate purpose requires that fundamental norms exist: if the norm that a person
ought to have property P depends on a non-normative property N, then P cannot provide ultimate
purpose to a person. Though I have not yet discussed it in any depth, via negativa physicalism has a
commitment to the nonexistence of fundamental normative properties. Given that, via negativa seems
outright inconsistent with the existence of ultimate purpose for individual lives or the universe as a whole.
There is no existential wiggle room for via negativa physicalism on this, unlike the case with God
or the soul. What is existentially relevant to many people, I take it, is that there is ultimate purpose, which
is purpose that has some fundamental positive normative aspect. Tasks which function to attain some
intermediate end (like manual labor, perhaps), or things we find intrinsically valuable but which do not
satisfy the norm that we ought to attain them (like pleasure, perhaps) are not ultimately purposeful to us.
Ultimate purpose instead requires a deeper connection to what is fundamentally and intrinsically good
and worthwhile, which requires the existence of fundamental normative facts or properties. Imagine
finding out that all of our desires were implanted into us by ancient aliens who return to Earth every few
millennia in order to feed on the byproducts of our civilization (e.g. plastic), and that this is the ultimate
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explanation for all of our interests—there are no deeper normative facts upon which our interests depend.
I suspect that in this scenario, interest-based facts would fail to satisfy the existential concerns that are
satisfied by possession of genuine ultimate purpose. Given these considerations, via negativa
physicalism as I have defined it is inconsistent with anything which could fulfill our ultimate-purposebased existential interests.
However, one could remove the no-fundamental-normativity constraint from via negativa, which
would allow ultimate purpose to exist. While this is a perfectly acceptable way to modify via negativa—
and is largely consistent with via negativa’s philosophy of mind roots (though rationality is often
considered essentially normative)—I am here only interested in the full-blooded version of via negativa,
with all of its attendant existential consequences. I have two reasons: to limit the scope of my project (I
cannot entertain every conceivable version of physicalism), and because I think full-blooded via negativa
captures more of our intuitions about the “spirit of physicalism”: full-blooded via negativa seems to
capture a Copernican spirit of not positing any human-specific properties at the fundamental of reality,
whereas thinner (no-fundamental-mentality-only or no-fundamental-normativity-only) notions don’t do as
good a job at capturing this spirit.
5.3 Ultimate purpose and theory-based physicalism
So far, I have been assuming that neither notion of physicalism entails the other notion, but perhaps this
is a mistake. This assumption is relevant at this juncture because if theory-based physicalism allows for
fundamental normative facts or properties, then it is apparently consistent with the possibility of ultimate
purpose. But if theory-based physicalism entails that fundamental norms cannot exist, then it is—like via
negativa physicalism—inconsistent with the possibility of ultimate purpose. Does theory-based
physicalism entail that there is no fundamental normativity?
I take it that the logical positivists believed science is incapable of discovering or even describing
fundamental normative facts, due to the nature of science as the project of discerning and cataloguing
regularities in sense-data. This, combined with the verificationist thesis that the only meaningful nonanalytic and fact-stating sentences are ones that can be empirically verified, led to the development of
non-cognitivist views such as emotivism, which says that normative assertions are not fact-stating, but
rather that they are emotional expressions of our preferences for how people ought to behave or what
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they ought to desire, and those preferences are determined by non-normative psychological properties.
Under this view, the utterance ‘murder is wrong’ really just means ‘murder: boo!’.
Were the positivists right? Can science not possibly describe the world as containing fundamental
normative facts? Consider the two commitments of theory-based physicalism: that all events are
constrained by natural laws, and that everything that exists is in principle describable by an ideal human
physics. The first constraint seems not to be violated by the existence of fundamental norms: the
existence of fundamental norms does not require that there be events which are not law-governed.
What about the ideal human physics constraint? This is a bit loose, but it is nonetheless
intelligible to ask whether human cognitive and perceptual capacities prevent us from ever having a
science that could describe the world as containing fundamental norms. To start: if we were incapable of
conceiving of fundamental norms, then obviously an ideal human science would not be able to describe
the world as realizing those sorts of normative properties. But we seem to be capable of properly
conceiving of fundamental normative properties—much of the metaethical literature about moral facts and
non-naturalism would otherwise be rendered incoherent. If this were so, then even the paragon defender
of common sense, G. E. Moore (1903), would count as not just wrong, but unintelligible!
What about human perceptual constraints? It seems plausible that we in principle cannot
perceive normative properties—doing so would violate Hume’s (1738) is-ought distinction, on the
assumption that we can only directly perceive non-normative states of affairs. Does this mean normative
properties cannot figure into our best science? I think not: we cannot perceive mathematical or other
abstract properties either. Yet I doubt very much that many people think this is a good enough reason to
believe that mathematical properties cannot be part of our best science.23 Likewise, though we cannot
perceive fundamental norms, this does not mean that they cannot be part of an ideal human science.
Hilary Putnam (1982) even argued that scientific practice is inextricably interwoven with normativity—as
he put it, there is no fact/value divide. Whether or not this is right, it nonetheless seems that theory-based
physicalism is consistent with the possible existence of fundamental norms, and thus is consistent with
ultimate purpose for individual humans or the universe.
6.1. Karma

23

See companions in the guilt arguments in metaethics, as in Lillehammer (2013).
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I said that there is little discussion in analytic philosophy on the notion of ‘ultimate purpose’—well, the
same goes tenfold for discussion in analytic philosophy on normatively-laden laws of nature like karma.
Nearly all literature pertaining to karma or the like in analytic philosophy is confined to scholarly work on
Asian religion and philosophy, though of course this work is not without philosophical merit (see Siderits
2007, Flanagan 2011 and Goodman 2014). And as far as I can tell, no one has weighed in on whether it
is possible for a fully physical world to have karmic laws in it, unlike every other topic I’ve discussed so
far.
I’m not specifically interested in karma, but rather the class of laws of nature of which karmic law
is a member. The laws in this class are causally-efficacious and normatively-laden. These laws are
sensitive to human action, and cause states of affairs to obtain in response to an action depending on
how that action relates to a norm built into the law. Karmic laws in this class punish or reward actions that
respectively violate or satisfy some norm. Though I’m not specifically interested in karma, I will center my
discussion on karma as a archetypal law from the class that I am interested in. Though existential
concern for karma is probably not as common in America, Europe or Australia (i.e. the current geographic
centers of analytic philosophy) as it is in other parts of the Earth, I nonetheless suspect that many people
have an existential interest that karmic or similar laws obtain in our world. But could such laws obtain in
an entirely physical world?
6.2 Via negativa physicalism and karma
If karma is a fundamental law of nature, and it essentially involves normativity, then karma puts
normativity into the fundamental level of reality—thus violating via negativa physicalism’s constraint
against fundamental normativity.24 I will suppose that karmic law is essentially normative. Need karma be
a fundamental law?
Many philosophers have become convinced that there are non-fundamental laws of nature, for
instance the laws posited by the special sciences which govern non-fundamental phenomena like
chemistry and biology. These laws are necessitated by fundamental laws, but are not identical to any
fundamental laws. Perhaps karma could be like a law of the special sciences, and thus plausibly nonfundamental.
24

As in my discussion of ultimate purpose, I will again assume a robust version of via negativa which
includes both no-fundamental-mentality and no-fundamental-normativity requirements.
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However, there is a difference between karma and special science laws which plausibly prevents
karma from counting as non-fundamental. Special science laws (assuming they are irreducible to lowerlevel laws) pick out real patterns in nature which are not explicit at the level of fundamental physics. For
instance, Fodor (1974) provides the example of Gresham’s law in economics that “bad” currency (which is
currency which has a nominal value higher than its commodity value) drives out “good” currency (which is
currency which has a roughly identical nominal and commodity value) from a market. Gresham’s law
provides testable predictions, which have been well demonstrated empirically, yet it is hard to imagine
what fundamental laws Gresham’s law might be reduced to. It seems to pick out real patterns at a high
level of nature which are not explicitly present at the level of physics.
Real and irreducible as Gresham’s law may be, whatever states of affairs it predicts to come
about will be the same states of affairs as what the fundamental laws of physics predicts will come about.
This point is demonstrated by Dennett (1991b): hypothetical Martians with only perfectly accurate
knowledge of fundamental physics—and no knowledge of higher-level phenomena—could accurately
predict what future states of affairs will obtain, even though they do not possess knowledge of real
patterns of nature that are described by the special sciences. The special science laws add nothing
causally novel to the world: the causal powers (if any) of the properties that figure in special science laws
are derived from the causal powers of the properties that figure in lower-level laws.
Karma, unlike special science laws, must involve properties with causal powers that are not
derived from the causal powers of properties of lower-level laws, or else karmic properties must depend
on fundamental properties that involve normativity. This is because karma is responsive to human
action—which is not especially problematic, as Gresham’s law too involves properties that are responsive
to human action—and karma causes states of affairs to come about depending on whether the human
action violates a norm or not. This norm-sensitivity requires that karma has causal power that does not
depend on non-normative fundamental properties—if fundamental laws are not norm-sensitive, then is
seems plausible that the higher-level laws that depend on them will not be norm-sensitive either.25
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One might recall Donald Davidson (1970) famously arguing that the rules governing rationality are both
normative and not reducible to lower-level laws, even though they supervene on lower-level laws. If so,
then don’t the rules of rationality count as a compelling example of irreducible high-level laws that are
essentially normative? I am not at all an expert on Davidson exegesis, which is difficult, but my
understanding is that he took rules (which are explicitly not natural laws, since they grant exceptions)
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So it seems that via negativa is inconsistent with karma, as well as inconsistent with the laws in
the class which karma belongs to. However, could our existential concern regarding karma be satisfied by
something other than a genuine law of nature? I think the answer is “yes”—just as something other than a
genuine immortal soul could satisfy our soul-based existential concerns, something other than genuine
karma could satisfy our karma-based existential concerns.
Why might someone find karma to be valuable? I think for the following reason: if karma is real
then there is something in the world which ensures that bad actions are punished and good actions are
rewarded. Karma creates practical consequences for moral or immoral behavior, and maintains a moral
order in the universe (as God does for theists). Such a moral order might be maintained, though, by
something other than a full-blooded law of nature.
Again, imagine a population of digital beings who exist in a computer simulation. This virtual world
has ersatz laws that are analogous to the laws of physics, as well as an ersatz law analogous to karma.
This means that good actions in the virtual world are rewarded, and bad actions punished. From the
perspective of these digital beings, there is a law of karma—even though no such law really exists in that
world.
My feeling is that the karma-based existential concerns of these people ought to be satisfied,
even though karma doesn’t properly exist in their world. If this is right, then even though via negativa
physicalism is strictly speaking inconsistent with karma, our karma-based existential concerns might still
be satisfied in a world where via negativa physicalism is true.
6.3 Theory-based physicalism and karma
There seems to be no problematic tension between theory-based physicalism and the possible existence
of karma. Karma is a law, and plausibly not principly outside the scope of potential human scientific
inquiry. These are the two constraints I have deemed to constitute theory-based physicalism, so karma
could exist in a world wherein theory-based physicalism is true.
7. Epicurean freedom and scientific imperialism
So far I’ve only assessed the apparent negative existential consequences of physicalism, which are the
consequences of physicalism that plausibly would make a large number of people believe that life is less
governing rationality to be causally explanatory, but not independently causally efficacious. This is unlike
karma, which has causal power that is independent of the causal power of fundamental laws.
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worth living. However, physicalism also seems to have a few positive existential conditions: (i) we need
not fear supernatural forces of nature, which is a condition I’ll call “Epicurean freedom” and (ii) we can in
principle know all of nature, which is a condition I’ll call “scientific imperialism”. If the negative existential
consequences of physicalism constitute the horror of physicalism, then these two positive consequences
represent the hope of physicalism.
Epicurean freedom inverts what I take to be the typical attitude toward physicalism’s negative
existential consequences: some people may think that life is more worth living if God, immortal soul,
robust freedom, ultimate purpose or karma do not exist. For instance, atheists may be drawn to the
attitude Rorty describes as not needing to justify ourselves before a divine authority. With the absence of
ultimate purpose, some individuals may feel more agency to create meaning and purpose for themselves.
Someone might find a normatively-laden law of nature like karma to oppressively impose a moral order
on the world. Without robust free will, one might feel relieved that humans are not ultimately causally
responsible for their actions, and thus perhaps not blame-worthy for their morally bad actions. And like
Epicurus, some may be comforted by the idea that life is finite rather than infinite, and that no torments
potentially await in an afterlife, or in an endless succession of future lives.
Since Epicurean freedom is just an inversion of the negative existential attitude toward the
consequences of physicalism that I have discussed so far, this attitude attaches itself to the two versions
of physicalism to the same degree that they entail those various conditions. Given that the same set of
conditions can be taken as either existentially positive or negative, one might wonder whether they ought
to be considered as making life more or less worth living. What is the correct existential attitude one ought
to have toward these conditions?
In my view, this is where reasons end. Some people are so psychologically constituted as to find
these conditions to be existentially negative, and some people are constituted to find them existentially
positive. Whether one is emboldened or frightened by these consequences of physicalism (in its two
guises) largely depends, it seems to me, on how much metaphysical reassurance one requires. Those
who can say “yes” to life even in the absence of life-affirming myths may feel emboldened by a
metaphysically stark and reassurance-free physical world, whereas those more in need of the comfort of
myth will grow terrified.
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Scientific imperialism is more straightforward: via negativa physicalism obviously does not entail
that we can in principle come to possess a complete scientific understanding of the world, and theorybased physicalism does. This is because scientific imperialism is part of the definition of theory-based
physicalism, and not part of via negativa. Even if there is nothing fundamentally mental or normative in
the world, there might still be things about the world we cannot know. If theory-based physicalism as I
have defined it is true, then there is nothing in principle that we cannot know through scientific inquiry—
though this of course does not mean that we will actually achieve such knowledge, for instance if our
species first destroys itself or we stop pursuing scientific knowledge.
8. Conclusion
I’ve looked at various prima facie existentially relevant consequences of physicalism with the intent of
determining which, if any, really are consequences of physicalism. Since there are two popular ways to
understand physicalism, the project has been bifurcated into determining which are the consequences of
theory-based physicalism, and which are the consequences of via negativa physicalism. In summary: via
negativa physicalism entails that there is no free will or ultimate purpose in the world, and is strictly
speaking inconsistent with the existence of God, immortal soul or karma. However, it is consistent with
facsimiles of God, immortal soul and karma which may be existentially equivalent to the genuine articles.
Theory-based physicalism is inconsistent with the existence of God, but consistent with the
existence of immortal soul, free will, karma, and ultimate purpose. Our scientific imperialist urges are
satisfied by theory-based physicalism, but not by via negativa physicalism. Epicurean freedom, which is a
positive existential stance toward the nonexistence of God, soul, free will, karma or ultimate purpose,
attaches itself to the two versions of physicalism to the same degree that these entail the nonexistence of
these various things—thus via negativa seems to gives us more Epicurean freedom than theory-based
physicalism. Where does this leave us?
We should endeavor to believe the view which has the best claim to truth, and go where the
arguments lead us. Even if someone is inclined toward one or another version of physicalism, with its
attendant particular existential consequences, this is not a guide to determining that it is true. For that, we
cannot simply look at the existential consequences that I have been discussing, but must look elsewhere.
Perhaps one’s prefered definition of physicalism is inconsistent with the existence of God. Well, if there is
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some excellent argument that God exists, then this version of physicalism must be given up (of course, I
do not think there is any such argument). In the next section I’ll consider reasons to prefer via negativa
physicalism over other views.
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IV. A Minimally Mysterian Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

The causal closure argument, as discussed by Papineau (2001), provide a strong reason to rule out
interactive Cartesian-esque dualism: starting in the 20th century, we have acquired compelling empirical
evidence that all human behavior can be causally explained without any appeal to fundamentally mental
phenomena. To put the point in a slightly different way, it seems that neuroscience describes causally
sufficient conditions for the occurence of our verbal, bodily, and other mind-caused behavior, which
appears to rule out a soul (or other non-brain thing) from doing causal work in the production of that
behavior. If one were to nonetheless maintain that the mind is completely distinct from the brain, it seems
that one would be forced to embrace epiphenomenalism—which says that mental properties are not
causally efficacious—or overdetermination—which says that physical effects have both sufficient physical
and nonphysical causes. Neither option seems plausible. This constrains the range of solutions to the
mind-body problem to some familiar sort of physicalism (I will focus on “Type-B” physicalism, to employ
Chalmers’ 2002 terminology) or some variety of Russellian monism (specifically: panpsychism,
panprotopsychism, or Russellian physicalism), since these are the only candidate views which are
consistent with causal closure and which avoid overdetermination or epiphenomenalism.
The goal in this section of the dissertation is to see which of these views has the strongest claim
to the truth. Since these are all views on the nature of consciousness, my focus is on how well these
competing accounts explain consciousness relative to each other. But what is consciousness?
Phenomenal consciousness consists of the “what-it-is-likeness” (Nagel 1974) of subjective
experience, as typified by one’s feeling of pain in the lower back, the sight of a neon yellow sign, or the
taste of well-aged cheese.26 Consciousness, to put it mildly, is weird: unlike apparently all other natural
phenomena, it seems to not be explicable in scientific terms (Levine 1983) nor inferable from scientific
facts (Jackson 1982). Yet—putting aside so-called “illusionism” (Frankish 2016) which completely denies
the existence of phenomenal consciousness—we know that consciousness is real. It is what we are most
and best familiar with, present during all of our waking hours and many of our sleeping ones as well. How

I will use ‘phenomenal’, ‘subjective‘, and ‘conscious’ interchangeably throughout the text. This is
unproblematic because I am not here concerned with non-phenomenal disambiguations of ‘conscious’,
for instance access consciousness or report consciousness (see Block 2002).
26
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can something so familiar be so inexplicable, an oddity that is seemingly unique in its resistance to any
sort of reductive scientific analysis?
Physicalists generally say that consciousness is not fundamental, and instead typically identify
phenomenal properties with neurobiological or functional properties. These philosophers believe that
consciousness is not metaphysically special in any way that would substantially distinguish it from other
phenomena described by the natural sciences. Nonphysicalists—a group which includes dualists,
idealists and panpsychists—instead assert that consciousness is fundamental, and cannot be explained
in terms of any lower-level nonmenal phenomena.27
In my eyes, both of these well-explored stances fail to properly account for consciousness. The
traditional physicalist position just described seems committed to the possibility of an explanation of
consciousness in terms of scientifically scrutable phenomena, which runs against the common intuition
that something important—the important something, in fact—is left out of such an explanation. The
strangeness of consciousness is seemingly ignored under such an account—no good!
Turning to the other side, nonphysicalism gives up far too easily in the face of the apparent
inexplicability of consciousness. While it is perhaps true that phenomenal properties cannot be inferred
from knowledge of scientifically scrutable properties (which are properties explicitly referred to by
science), and that scientifically scrutable properties fail to explain consciousness, it seems a misstep to
arrive at the conclusion that mentality is therefore a fundamental phenomenon. Such a view violates the
Copernican attitude of science-respecting and secular philosophers that mentality—which seems to be
distinctive of only a select few highly complex organic beings in our tiny corner of the universe—is not a
basic feature of reality. Yet physicalism and nonphysicalism are the only available options, since
nonphysicalism is just the negation of physicalism. What to do?
Fortunately, a relatively unexplored view called “Russellian physicalism” (Stoljar 2001; Montero
2010, 2015; Pereboom 2011; McClelland 2013; Brown 2017) offers an account of the nature of
consciousness which respects and addresses its strangeness without committing the nonphysicalist error
of making mentality fundamental. Russellian physicalism asserts that there is more to the physical world

I’m avoiding “neutral monism”, since I agree with Amy Kind (2015) that the view is unstable, and either
collapses to physicalism (if neutral properties are not mental or specially related to mentality) of some sort
of non-physicalism (if neutral properties are mental or specially related to mentality)
27
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than just what is directly referred to by physics. Physics only tells us about the causal, structural, and
relational nature of the world—things in physics are defined by what they do, and how they
spatiotemporally and causally relate to other things. One might think that there is something left out of this
description: the intrinsic nature of things, which is distinct from any dispositional, structural or relational
characterization. Russellian physicalism urges that the underlying intrinsic nature of the physical world,
which is inscrutable to direct scientific inquiry, consists of “categorical” properties. These categorical
properties are not defined by causal dispositions, structure or relations, yet the dispositional, structural
and relational properties of fundamental things depend on them. Even though categorical properties are
not part of physics, they are nonetheless physical in the via negativa sense, since they are neither mental
nor especially tied to mentality.
But what does this metaphysical view about the inner nature of the fundamental physical have to
do with consciousness? The following: phenomenal consciousness depends upon both non-categorical
and categorical features of the world. Since the view is physicalist, mentality is not fundamental, but an
appropriate arrangement of fundamental categorical properties does yield a non-fundamental categorical
property which is phenomenally mental.28 Putting it another way, the brain has both high-level categorical
and non-categorical properties, and phenomenal consciousness is identical to one or more of its
categorical properties.
In addition to Russellian physicalism, several nonphysicalist Russellian views have also been
developed (see Chalmers 2015). Here, though, I’m only interested in Russellian physicalism, which
denies that fundamental categorical properties are mental or that they bear any special relationship to
mentality. Other Russellian views add little new to the debate: Russellian panpsychism (which says that
fundamental categorical properties are mental) or panprotopsychism (which says that fundamental
categorical properties are protomental) all continue to violate our Copernican intuitions by putting mind at

28

Positing high-level categorical properties which depend on both lower-level categorical and noncategorical properties may require expanding the ontological taxonomy beyond what has typically been
discussed in this context, e.g. by Pereboom (2013) or Chalmers (2003). More on this in footnote thirty
five.
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the bottom of nature.29 No good! Russellian physicalism, however, offers something that these other
Russellian positions don’t.
Recall the two problems I identified that theories of consciousness have so-far faced:
(i) Inscrutability: Consciousness cannot be explained by, inferred from, or reduced to scientifically
scrutable properties
(ii) Copernicanism: The fundamental level of nature is not tainted by mentality nor by a special
relationship to mentality
Most physicalist theories of consciousness thus far have violated Inscrutability, and
nonphysicalist theories have violated Copernicanism.30 Russellian physicalism is a unique view that can
satisfy both requirements. Or so it seems!
A savvy philosopher might stop me here, and inform me that this sort of approach is not novel in
philosophy of mind: there are at least two sorts of physicalist views that recognize and try to preserve the
strangeness of consciousness. These are referred to as “mysterianism” and “the phenomenal concept
strategy”.31 Both admit that consciousness is weird from our perspective, but deny that this epistemic
strangeness entails any metaphysical consequences. Mysterianism has been most famously argued for
by Colin McGinn (1989), whereas the phenomenal concept strategy has had more widespread support
from physicalist philosophers of mind (e.g. Hill 1997, Carruthers 2001, Papineau 2002, Carruthers and
29

Russellian nonphysicalism adds the following to the debate: Russellianism gives nonphysicalists a
different option to account for mental causation beyond the standard options available to traditional
dualism, which are interactionism, epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. Instead, Russellian
nonphysicalists can admit causal closure, yet have nonphysical mentality be causally efficacious in virtue
of being the role-filler of fundamental physics. In my eyes, though, this is not nearly as significant as the
aid that Russellianism gives to physicalism, since at the end of the day any sort of nonphysicalism will
continue to violate Copernicanism.
30 One might think that panpsychism and panprotopsychism do not really violate Copernicanism: these
views deny that mentality is a distinctively human feature of the universe, and instead assert that
mentality is very common. I think this response misses the point: imagine a world in which pantheism is
true, and that world’s cosmic God created humans in her image. In such a world, human-defining
properties are not specific to humans, since the whole universe instantiates these properties as well.
Nevertheless, this scenario clearly violates Copernican intuitions. Any view that makes human-defining
properties metaphysically special, I take it, is one that violates Copernicanism—and this includes
panpsychism and panprotopsychism.
31 This leaves out Nagelian monism, as discussed by Daniel Stoljar (2015). Nagelian monism says that
there are non-categorical facts that we currently do not have access to, and a science which utilizes those
facts could explain consciousness. My feeling is that Nagelian monism fails to satisfactorily address antiphysicalist challenges (see Alter 2016), and it has less widespread support than the two physicalist views
that I focus on, so will not consider it further in this dissertation. Of course, this does not mean that the
view does not warrant further scrutiny.
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Veillet 2007, Balog 2009). What is the difference between Russellian physicalism and these other views,
especially considering that all accept that consciousness is epistemically special but not metaphysically
fundamental?
My project consists in spelling out the difference between Russellian physicalism and these two
other physicalist views, and arguing that of all of them, Russellian physicalism offers the most plausible
and satisfying account of consciousness. This is significant because the phenomenal concept strategy
and (to a lesser extent) mysterianism have been seen as the most plausible options for physicalist
philosophers who are impressed by the strangeness of consciousness.32 Hence, the goal here is not just
deeper elucidation of Russellian physicalism, as has already been done several times (e.g. Stoljar 2001;
Montero 2010, 2015; Brown 2017), but rather articulation of a positive argument for the conclusion that
Russellian physicalism offers the best explanation for the mystery of consciousness. Section one will
describe the core commitments of Russellian physicalism and explain how it answers typical challenges
to physicalism. Sections two and three will distinguish Russellian physicalism from, respectively,
McGinn’s mysterianism and from the phenomenal concept strategy, and explain why Russellian
physicalism is preferable to either of these views.33
1. What is Russellian Physicalism?
Russellian physicalism is a version of a more general view called ‘Russellian monism’, which states that
the fundamental level of the world has two features: a non-categorical, scientifically scrutable feature and
a categorical, scientifically inscrutable feature. The non-categorical part of the fundamental level consists
of dispositional, structural, relational and causal properties as described by physics—these properties are
defined by behavior and various relations (especially spatiotemporal relations) between fundamental
entities.
32

Of course, there are many additional options available for those not impressed by the strangeness of
consciousness. For instance, there is Block and Stalnaker’s (1999) view that brute explanatory gaps
permeate nature (so the explanatory gap for consciousness is not special), and there are a variety of
reductive neurobiological (e.g. Koch and Crick 1990), representationalist (e.g. Tye 1995) and functionalist
(e.g. Dennett 1978, Baars 1988) accounts of consciousness. I suspect that the recently popular
Integrated Information Theory (Tononi 2007), though sometimes adopted by nonphysicalists (e.g. Mørch
2018), will eventually be properly sorted into the reductive category as well (see Mindt 2017 for an
argument in this vein).
33 Note that these are not different versions of physicalism, but rather different approaches a physicalist
might take on the nature of consciousness and the epistemic and metaphysical challenges it seems to
present.
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Such scientifically scrutable, dispositionally/structurally/relationally-defined properties have
typically been thought to exhaust the set of fundamental physical properties—after all, ‘physicalism’ is
often thought of as the view that there is nothing over and above what is posited by physics. However,
Russellian monism adds that scientifically scrutable properties depend on even more fundamental
categorical properties. These categorical properties are scientifically inscrutable, and thus not directly
referred to by physics, yet they are the role-fillers of the physics-scrutable properties. Under this view,
something like an an electron has scrutable features—defined by what the electron does—and more
fundamental inscrutable features—defined by what the electron is, independent of its causal dispositions
or structural relations.34
According to Russellian physicalism, phenomenal consciousness depends upon fundamental
categorical properties which bear appropriate relations to each other. When fundamental categorical
properties are properly related, a non-fundamental categorical property is necessitated, which
accompanies some non-fundamental scientifically scrutable property—for instance, a neural or functional
property. Phenomenal properties are identical to certain of these non-fundamental categorical
properties.35
I have previously argued (2017) that Russellian physicalism is properly a version of physicalism in
the

sense that it does not posit fundamental mental or protomental properties, yet that the view

34

This way of describing Russellian physicalism makes categorical and non-categorical properties
distinct, and thus not modally coextensive. That is, there are (at minimum) worlds containing our world’s
non-categorical properties without our world’s categorical properties. However, one could wed Russellian
physicalism to dispositional essentialism (Bird 2005, 2007), which is the view that categorical properties
have their dispositional roles essentially, such that categorical and non-categorical properties cannot be
modally separated. For reasons that will become clear when I discuss Russellian physicalism’s answer to
the conceivability argument, this dispositional essentialist route is not advisable for a Russellian
physicalist, since it considerably weakens her response to Chalmers’ anti-physicalist criticism.
35 This view suggests an additional ontological category beyond those identified by Pereboom (2013) in
his discussion of relational vs. nonrelational properties. He identifies extrinsic properties, which are
relational; absolutely intrinsic properties, which are properties that are not relational and which do not
entirely depend on the relational properties of the bearer’s parts; and comparatively intrinsic properties,
which are non-relational properties which depend on the relational properties of the bearer’s parts.
Fundamental categorical properties are absolutely intrinsic, fundamental non-categorical properties are
extrinsic, and non-fundamental non-categorical properties are either relational or comparatively intrinsic.
Strictly speaking, this taxonomy does have a place for hybrid properties that depend both on absolutely
intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the bearer’s parts: these are a non-fundamental species of absolutely
intrinsic properties. However, it is convenient to have a term dedicated to this fourth ontological category:
I am referring to these terms as “non-fundamental categorical properties”.
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nonetheless offers satisfactory answers to various anti-physicalist demands and challenges in a way that
non-physicalists should find reasonable. Here I’ll briefly clarify and expand upon this argument.
Crucially, if Russellian physicalism is to truly count as a version of physicalism, the following
conditions must be satisfied:
(i) No Fundamental Mentality: fundamental properties are not mental
(ii) No Fundamental Protomentality: fundamental properties are not protomental
The No Fundamental Mentality condition needs no explanation: physicalism as I have defined it
requires that there be no fundamental mental properties, which is equivalent to this condition. However,
the need for a No Fundamental Protomentality condition is less obvious. Why think physicalism is
inconsistent with fundamental protomentality? After all, don’t all non-eliminativist, physicalist accounts of
the mind deem mental properties to ultimately depend on fundamental properties—thereby making those
fundamental properties protomental in some sense?
To answer, I must distinguish between physically problematic and unproblematic senses of
‘protomental’. Some property is protomental in the unproblematic sense if a mental property depends on
that property, but there is not a special connection between the lower-level protomental property and the
higher-level mental property. For instance, under traditional type-identity theory (Smart 1959), mental
properties are identical to neural properties, which makes chemical properties protomental in the
unproblematic sense—neural properties depend on the lower-level chemical properties that they are
constituted by. These chemical properties are not specially related to mentality: the same chemical
properties are capable of constituting non-mental properties, and are not restricted to constituting
neural/mental properties. With the exception of eliminativism, which denies any mentality whatsoever
exists, all physicalist theories of mentality posit protomentality in this unproblematic sense—they must, for
else mentality would be fundamental, and the view would not be physicalist.
However, there is a sense of ‘protomental’ that is physically problematic, and plausibly the
existence of fundamental protomental properties in this problematic sense is inconsistent with the truth of
physicalism. Problematically protomental properties are properties which have a special relationship to
mentality that goes beyond the typical sort of dependence relationship that physically unproblematic
protomental properties bear to mental properties. Kevin Morris (2016) proposes a modal test to determine
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whether fundamental categorical properties are problematically protomental or not: if it is possible to have
a world that duplicates the dispositional/relational/structural properties of our world, but has different or no
categorical properties, and if the only additional difference between our world and that world is a
difference in mentality, then fundamental categorical properties are protomental in a problematic sense.
Morris contends that the fundamental categorical properties posited by Russellian physicalism fail his
test, rendering Russellian “physicalism” a version of physicalism in name only.36
The first step of Morris’ test asks you to conceive of a world that is just like our world as it is
described by physics, but which does not contain the same categorical properties as our world does—it
contains “swapped” (i.e. different) or “bare” (i.e. absent) categorical properties. Aside from dispositional
essentialists, who say that categorical and non-categorical properties cannot be separated in this way,
most Russellian physicalists will accept this sort of world as a possibility. The reason they typically accept
the possibility of this sort of world is a consequence of the Russellian physicalist’s answer to Chalmers’
(1996) anti-physicalist conceivability argument.
The conceivability argument says that it is conceivable that there could be a minimal physical
duplicate of our world which does not duplicate our world’s phenomenal properties. Worlds in this class
which lack penomenal properties altogether are “zombie worlds”, which contain humans who act
conscious and have the same neural and functional properties as us, but completely lack subjective
experiences. If these worlds are conceivable, then (according to Chalmers) they are possible. If they are
possible, then physicalism is false, since physicalism requires that phenomenal properties be
necessitated by physical properties. So, if the premises are accepted, physicalism is false.
Russellian physicalists generally accept all parts of this argument except for the first premise, that
zombie worlds are conceivable. This rejection is not on the grounds that consciousness really is a
mundane, scientifically scrutable property of the world that can be inferred from lower-level physical
properties just like anything else, as reductive physicalists like Dennett assert; rather, Russellian
physicalists deny that consciousness is scientifically scrutable at all.
A version of Russellian physicalism could be constructed which would trivially pass Morris’ test: this
alternative formulation denies that categorical properties are constitutive of consciousness, and instead
identifies consciousness with non-fundamental non-categorical properties. Fundamental categoricals
would be posited for some non-mind-based other reason, perhaps to make the world concrete rather than
abstract. However, such a version of Russellian physicalism adds nothing discourse on the mind-body
problem, so I will not consider it further.
36
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The reason zombie worlds seem conceivable is because, whenever we have so-far thought of
zombie worlds, we have been thinking of worlds which duplicate only the scientifically strutable, noncategorical aspects of our world. The categorical aspects of our world are left out of such conceptions. A
minimal non-categorical-plus-categorical duplicate of our world could not lack the same phenomenal
properties as are realized in our world—and so a more robust conception of the physical world leaves no
room for the possibility of zombies. This does not mean that we know what it means to truly conceive of a
full physical duplicate of our world, or that we can infer phenomenal properties from physical properties:
we do not have robust enough conceptions of fundamental categorical properties, and only have
acquaintance with them in virtue of having access to our own phenomenal properties, which depend on
fundamental categorical properties. Lacking robust concepts for these categorical properties, we cannot
infer phenomenal properties from physical properties, nor explain phenomenal consciousness in terms of
physical properties, since we ultimately do not fully understand the physical.37
For this reason, the Russellian physicalist must accept the possibility of worlds with bare or
swapped categoricals that are mentally distinct from our world—allowing these possibilities provides the
Russellian physicalist with resources to plausibly deny that we can conceive of full physical duplicates of
our worlds which are zombie worlds, as well as explain what we are really doing when we think we are
conceiving of such worlds. Now: recall that acceptance of the possibility of worlds with bare or swapped
categoricals is a necessary (but not sufficient) requirement in Morris’ test for problematic protomentality:
categorical properties are only protomental if a change to the categorical properties without a change to
non-categoricals is possible, and the change necessitates a change to mental properties. Since
Russellian physicalists accept this, does this mean that they must also accept the existence of
problematically protomental properties?

This appeal to “robust” concepts, in contrast with “thin” concepts, warrants an explanation. I take a
robust concept to be one with enough descriptive content to fix a de re reference (restricting the scope of
possible referents to the actual world), whereas thin concepts have enough content to fix a reference to a
class, but not to any particular member of that class. Our phenomenal concepts are robust, since we can
descriptively refer to individual experiences. However, our concepts of fundamental categoricals are thin:
we cannot refer to any particular fundamental categorical properties, though we can refer to the class of
categoricals. Of course, there are a host of issues concerning descriptive (as opposed to
Kripkean/Millean) de re reference which I would like to avoid—hopefully what I have said here will suffice
for the purposes of this dissertation without getting me into too much hot water.
37
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The answer is “no”, but before I explain this “no”, it would be helpful to spell out Morris’ argument
more explicitly:
1. Russellian physicalism’s unique response to the conceivability argument requires the
possibility of worlds which are categorically-thus-phenomenally different than the actual world, yet
non-categorically identical (“scrute-worlds”, for short)
2. If there could be scrute-worlds worlds which differ from our world only phenomenally, then
categorical properties have a physically-problematic relationship to phenomenology
3. There could be scrute-worlds which are minimal non-categorical duplicates of our world and
which are different only in phenomenal properties
∴ 4. Categorical properties have a physically-problematic relationship to phenomenology
As I said, most Russellian physicalists will accept the first premise, because otherwise they lose
their unique answer to the conceivability argument. For instance, Russellian physicalists who are also
dispositional essentialists, and think that properties possess their nomological profiles essentially (such
that categorical and non-categorical properties cannot be disentangled), cannot explain what we are
conceiving of when we conceive of zombie worlds. They must instead say that we are making a more
serious error, since under this view there are no zombie worlds that are even scrutably similar to our
world—and thus Russellian physicalists who are dispositional essentialists are left without an answer to
this anti-physicalist argument.
Maybe a Russellian physicalist could deny premise two on the grounds that fundamental
protomental properties are never physically problematic—this view would say that only fully mental
fundamental properties pose a problem for a physicalist. However, I agree with Morris that properties
which exist only to generate mentality seem strongly in tension with a physicalist view that denies the
existence of fundamental mentality. To borrow a metaphor from Robert Howell (2009), problematically
protomental properties are like a mentality-bestowing chair: placing an otherwise unminded thing like a
rock in the chair suddenly gives it subjective experience, without any change in the thing’s structure or
composition. Surely the existence of such a chair would threaten the truth of physicalism—and so too for
problematically protomental properties more generally.
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As I see it, the appropriate place to push against Morris’ argument is the third premise, that there
could be scrute-worlds (again, worlds that have different categorical properties than our world, yet are
non-categorically identical) which are only different phenomenologically. But how can a Russellian
physicalist deny this? Mustn’t they admit that scrute-worlds could exist which are different only in
phenomenal properties, since they think phenomenal properties depend on fundamental categorical
properties?
No: an escape route presents itself if the Russellian physicalist says that phenomenal properties
are not the only sort of non-fundamental categorical properties. Rather, the Russellian physicalist should
instead say that our world realizes a great variety of non-fundamental, non-phenomenal categorical
properties. On this precisification of Russellian physicalism, a high-level object like a desk has noncategorical properties like hardness and mass, and additionally has categorical properties that are
inscrutable to us. What do these properties do? Well, since they are non-phenomenal, they cannot give
desks subjective experience (quite a moral relief to me, as I am always banging my knees against my
desk or slamming my fist down when I get upsetting news). Instead, perhaps these non-fundamental
categorical properties make desks concrete rather than merely abstract. Regardless of whatever the more
fine-grained description, non-phenomenal categorical properties must give objects a non-mental inner
being of some sort that cannot be revealed through observation or interaction.
How does this move help refute Morris’ argument? In the following way: the Russellian physicalist
can now say that scrute-worlds would differ in both phenomenal and non-phenomenal respects. Just as a
change to fundamental non-categorical properties would change all the higher-level properties that
depend on them, so too would a change to fundamental categorical properties affect all non-fundamental
categorical properties. In swapped categorical worlds, both phenomenal and non-phenomenal properties
would be different than those in the actual world (since the fundamental categoricals are different). In
bare categorical worlds, all non-fundamental categorical properties would be absent (since the
fundamental categoricals are absent). Thus, the third premise of the argument above can be plausibly
denied: scrute-worlds cannot differ only in phenomenal properties. This allows the Russellian physicalist’s
fundamental categoricals pass Morris’ test, making them not problematically related to mentality.
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So far I have explained Russellian physicalism relative to the conceivability argument; what about
the other standard arguments against physicalism, such as Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument or
Levine’s (1983) explanatory gap argument? Russellian physicalism gives straightforward answers to
these arguments: when Mary the brilliant neuroscientist leaves her black-and-white room for the first time
and sees red, she genuinely learns about a physical property that she did not have knowledge of when
she was in the room. She becomes newly acquainted with a non-fundamental categorical property, on the
grounds that her scientific knowledge was only of non-categorical properties. She could not have inferred
what phenomenal redness is like from knowledge of neuroscientific properties, since phenomenal
redness is not a property of that sort. Likewise for the explanatory gap: it makes sense that scientifically
scrutable, non-categorical facts fail to explain consciousness, since consciousness is of a different sort.
We cannot explain a categorical property only in terms of non-categorical properties.
There are some other issues facing Russellian physicalism, for instance a version of the
combination problem (Chalmers 2017) which says that subjects cannot come about from any
arrangement of non-subjects, and a criticism that categorical properties are epiphenomenal (Howell
2015), since non-categorical properties seem sufficient on their own to cause physical effects. Rather
than develop my own solutions to these issues, I defer to the adequate answers that have been given
elsewhere: McClelland (2013) argues that self-representing systems can form subjects, and that the rest
of the issue constituting the combination problem comes from a requirement that subjects have intrinsic
properties (an issue which Russellian physicalism is obviously equipped to handle). Alter and Coleman (in
preparation) argue that categorical properties, as the role-realizers of fundamental non-categorical
properties, can be causally efficacious, even though different categorical properties may have scrutablyidentical effects in worlds of swapped categoricals.
This wraps up my description of Russellian physicalism. Now to compare this view against what I
take to be the best physicalist contenders for a viable theory of consciousness. Is Russellian physicalism
really distinct from mysterianism or the phenomenal concept strategy, and if so, are there good reasons
to prefer Russellian physicalism to these other views? On both counts, I think the answer is “yes”.
2. McGinn’s Mysterianism
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Mysterianism is the view that human beings cannot solve the mind-body problem on the grounds that we
are cognitively closed from acquiring a solution. McGinn (1989, p. 350) explains cognitive closure in the
following way: “A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to a property P (or theory T) if and only
if the concept-forming procedures at M's disposal cannot extend to a grasp of P (or an understanding of
T).”
If McGinn is right, then we cannot solve the mind-body problem because we cannot grasp the
appropriate concepts that would allow us to solve it. Opponents of mysterianism (e.g. Dennett 1991)
typically reject the view because it is what it says it is: mysterianism fully accepts that phenomenal
consciousness is completely mysterious to us, and that there is nothing we can positively say about it. A
mysterian might venture a guess about why consciousness is so mysterious to us, but this can never be
anything more than an unfounded speculation—or else we would understand something substantial about
consciousness and its place in nature. Such guesses are like the hypotheses that monkeys might make
about why they cannot grasp fundamental physics—woefully inadequate and hopelessly unjustified.
McGinn offers such a guess when he suggests that our perceptually-derived concepts are necessarily
spatial, but that a solution to the mind-body problem perhaps requires non-spatial representations. This
hypothesis about the source of the mystery of consciousness is purely speculative, for otherwise we
would grasp something about the nature of consciousness (that it requires non-spatial representations,
which seems to suggest that it is a nonspatial phenomenon).
Is Russellian physicalism a species of mysterianism? At a glance, it seems that it might be:
Russellian physicalism asserts that there are properties which are outside of our scientific grasp, and that
the ungraspability of these properties is the source of consciousness’ strangeness for us. However, upon
closer inspection, it turns out that Russellian physicalism is not a version of mysterianism as McGinn is
conceiving of it. At best, Russellian physicalism might be considered a cousin of mysterianism, but
certainly not in the same nuclear family. This is because Russellian physicalism gives a positive account
of the nature of consciousness and its place in nature, and diagnoses the strangeness of consciousness
as a consequence of facts about the world, not facts about the limited minds of human beings.
That Russellian physicalism is not identical to McGinn’s mysterianism can be clearly seen when
you look at what McGinn explicitly says about his view. For instance, McGinn distinguishes his view from
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any sort of constructive account of consciousness. “One form [of solution to the mind-body problem],
which we may call constructive, attempts to specify some natural property of the brain (or body) which
explains how consciousness can be elicited from it. … The approach I favour is naturalistic but not
constructive: I do not believe we can ever specify what it is about the brain that is responsible for
consciousness”(McGinn 1989, p. 350). Russellian physicalism identifies a natural property of the brain—a
non-fundamental categorical property—as what is responsible for consciousness. This makes Russellian
physicalism a broadly constructive account of the sort that McGinn rejects.
A more explicit reason to think that Russellian physicalism is not a version of mysterianism comes
in footnote two about panpsychism and panprotopsychism. “Attributing specks of proto-consciousness to
the constituents of matter is … extravagant. I shall here be assuming that panpsychism, like all other
extant constructive solutions, is inadequate as an answer to the mind-body problem”(McGinn 1989, p.
350). Russellian physicalists should agree with McGinn that attributing mentality or (problematic)
protomentality to the fundamental level of reality is not a good move. However, they should additionally
deny that explanations of this sort aren’t useful: Russellian physicalism is in the same boat as
panpsychism and panprotopsychism when it comes to the sort of explanation of consciousness it is
giving. All of these views say that positing fundamental categorical properties with intrinsic natures that
are not revealed through physics can help us solve the mind-body problem. So, McGinn’s criticism of
panpsychism and panprotopsychism additionally works to distance his view from Russellian physicalism.
Finally, McGinn says of our understanding of the physical that “… [Locke] thought that our ideas
of matter are quite sharply constrained by our perceptions and so concluded that the true science of
matter is eternally beyond us … It looks today as if Locke was wrong about our capacity to fathom the
nature of the physical world”(McGinn 1989, p. 352). Thus, for McGinn, the mystery of consciousness does
not arise due to an inadequate account of the nature of the physical, and a theory like Russellian
physicalism—which explains consciousness relative to certain fundamental physical properties—is
doomed to fail. Rather, McGinn thinks the mystery lies at some sort of “psychophysical nexus”. What
does this mean?
I believe McGinn’s view is the following: consciousness is identical to some garden-variety,
scientifically scrutable property of the brain, but we cannot ever grasp how this could possibly be so. For
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instance, he says there exists a scientific theory—inaccessible to cognitively limited human beings—
which “… describes the link between consciousness and the brain in a way that is no more remarkable
(or alarming) than the way we now describe the link between the liver and bile”(McGinn 1989, p. 361-62).
Russellian physicalism is a constructive account of consciousness which emphasizes our hitherto
inadequate conception of the physical as responsible for the mind-body problem, which can be solved (in
thought, if not in science) by expanding our notion of the physical. All the better for Russellian
physicalism: McGinn’s view is too pessimistic about our chances of addressing the problem of
consciousness. Mysterianism makes consciousness too mysterious—if McGinn were right, we could not
conclusively say anything positive about subjective experience or its place in nature. Russellian
physicalism, though pessimistic about any sort of reductive project in science that would explain
consciousness in terms of scientifically scrutable properties, is not nearly as pessimistic as is full-blooded
mysterianism.
That said, Russellian physicalism does bear a number of similarities to mysterianism. Both views
acknowledge that consciousness is not scientifically scrutable, and both say that we are perceptually
closed from access to the phenomenal properties of other mind-endowed beings. The biggest difference
between the two views is that Russellian physicalism deems that expanding our conceptual repertoire to
include (admittedly rather thin) concepts of categorical properties suffices to address the mind-body
problem, and McGinn thinks that no such conceptual expansion could possibly be helpful.
While mysterianism rightly acknowledges the strangeness of consciousness, it goes too far. It
says that consciousness cannot be understood by us in any way whatsoever. This is not at all satisfying:
we would like to know something about what consciousness is, and why the nature of consciousness
makes it so strange to us. Russellian physicalism plausibly does both tasks, and for this reason is
preferable to the extreme mysterianism of McGinn.
3. The Phenomenal Concepts Strategy
Like mysterianism, the phenomenal concept strategy asserts that there is an unbridgeable epistemic gap
between our scientific understanding of the world and an understanding of consciousness. However,
unlike mysterianism, the phenomenal concept strategy explains where this epistemic gap comes from,
and why it persists. Further, this strategy deflates the significance of the gap: though a satisfying
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explanation of consciousness will forever elude us, we may nonetheless acquire an accurate scientific
explanation of the phenomenon. Stated in this way, the phenomenal concept strategy has an air of
paradox, but there is no contradiction in the view. Allow me to explain.
According to the phenomenal concept strategy, the reason we think that neural or other
scientifically scrutable properties cannot explain phenomenal properties is because we have phenomenal
concepts that are distinct from and incommensurable with our physical concepts. Though the contents of
these two sorts of concepts might be the same (e.g. they both are about neural properties, if type-identity
theory is true), the mode of presentation is different. Phenomenal concepts present phenomenal
properties in a way that does not allow us to see how the phenomenal properties could be identical to any
physical properties, regardless of the true nature of those phenomenal properties.
There are a variety of ways to cash out the nature of phenomenal concepts relative to different
modes of presentation. For instance, philosophers have suggested that phenomenal concepts are
indexical (Perry 2001), quotational (Papineau 2002), recognitional (Loar 1990, Carruthers 2003), or
inferential-role-defined (Hill and McLaughlin 1999). The differences between these various accounts won’t
matter here—what matters is that all of these views say that phenomenal concepts present phenomenal
properties in a way that cannot be reconciled with how physical concepts present phenomenal properties.
The irreconcilability of phenomenal and physical concepts provides supporters of the phenomenal
concept strategy with a set of answers to typical anti-physicalist challenges. For instance, about
Jackson’s knowledge argument, they say that when Mary leaves the black-and-white room and first sees
red, she merely acquires a new phenomenal concept which presents the very same physical facts about
color perception that she was aware of from inside the room, but presents those facts in a different way.
Mary could infer knowledge of phenomenal properties from her physical knowledge while inside the room,
but was unable to acquire the phenomenal concept which presents the phenomenal properties in the way
they are presented when she actually sees red.
About Levine’s explanatory gap argument, the phenomenal concept strategist says that we do not
find any explanation of consciousness satisfactory because of the difference between our phenomenal
and physical concepts. The phenomenal concept presents facts about consciousness in one way, and the
physical concept presents those facts in a different way. There is an unbridgeable gap between the two
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modes of presentation of the same thing, which leaves us unsatisfied with any physical account of
consciousness. This is despite the availability to us of genuine scientific explanations of the physical
properties that phenomenal properties are identical to.
Finally, about the conceivability argument, the phenomenal concept theorist says that though
zombie worlds are conceivable, they are not possible. As with the other two arguments, the conceivability
of zombie worlds follows from the difference between physical and phenomenal concepts: when we think
of zombie worlds, we think of worlds which realize the contents of our physical concepts, and which do
not realize the contents of our phenomenal concepts. This seems viable to us because of the radically
different modes of presentation of those two sorts of concepts. As a matter of fact, though, such worlds
are not genuinely possible, since phenomenal properties are identical to physical properties.
As I see, it, the phenomenal concept strategy faces two serious objections that are not faced by
Russellian physicalism. One is Chalmers’ (2007) “master argument” against the phenomenal concept
strategy, which is easily responded to by the Russellian physicalist. The other issue is that the
phenomenal concept strategy is ultimately an error theory: it says that Mary is wrong when she thinks she
acquires new knowledge; we are wrong when we think that phenomenal properties are not explained by
physical properties; and we are wrong when we come to believe that zombie worlds are possible. Such
an error theory might be warranted if there were no other plausible physicalist explanation of
consciousness, but this is not the case. Russellian physicalism provides such a non-error-theoretic
account.
Chalmers’ master argument is the following:
1. Either we can conceive of zombie twins who possess the same phenomenal concepts as us, or
we cannot
2. If zombie twins who possess the same phenomenal concepts as us are conceivable, then
phenomenal concepts fail to explain our epistemic situation regarding consciousness
3. If zombie twins who possess the same phenomenal concepts as us are not conceivable, then
phenomenal concepts are not physical
∴ 4. Either phenomenal concepts fail to explain our epistemic situation regarding consciousness,
or they are not physical
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“Zombie twins” in this argument refers to our zombie duplicates in a minimally physical zombie
duplicate of our world (as I discussed in section one). The argument gets off the ground because
phenomenal concept strategists accept the conceivability of zombie worlds, even though they deny the
possibility of these worlds. The conclusion of the argument is a dilemma with two sharp points, neither of
which are acceptable to the phenomenal concept theorist: phenomenal concepts are useless to explain
the explanatory gap, or they are not physical. Let’s look at the details.
The first premise falls out of the law of excluded middle: either zombie twins can have the same
phenomenal concepts as we do, or they cannot. Suppose zombies can possess the same phenomenal
concepts as us, on the assumption that phenomenal concepts are entirely physical. Well, by stipulation,
the zombies are in a different epistemic situation than we are: we are conscious, and cannot understand
how physical properties explain phenomenal properties. Zombies are not conscious, so there is no
genuine explanatory puzzle for them: they have no phenomenal properties which are in need of
explaining. Yet, if we have exactly the same phenomenal concepts, we ought to be in exactly the same
epistemic situation. No good!
On the other hand, suppose that zombies cannot possess the same phenomenal concepts as us.
Yet how can this be if physicalism is true? Surely our minimal physical duplicates must possess the very
same concepts as us! It seems that the only explanation for why we and our zombie twins could possibly
possess different concepts is if the phenomenal concepts are at least partially constituted by something
nonphysical. Yet that cannot be the case for a physicalist phenomenal concept strategist!
Various responses by phenomenal concept strategists have been offered, and the dialectic can
get quite convoluted. For instance, Carruthers and Veillet’s (2007) response involves a sophisticated
appeal to the difference between first-person-characterized and third-person-characterized phenomenal
concepts (which they assert that Chalmers equivocates between). I am skeptical, but perhaps something
like Carruthers and Veillet’s response might ultimately succeed as a viable response to the master
argument. Regardless, Chalmers’ master argument presents a powerful prima facie objection to the
phenomenal concept strategy, and this powerful argument is easily sidestepped by a Russellian
physicalist.
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Russellian physicalism, like the phenomenal concept strategy, also says that the mind-body
problem exists because we have incommensurable physical and phenomenal concepts.38 The Russellian
physicalist does not explain this incommensurability in terms of different modes of presentation, as the
phenomenal concept strategist does; rather, phenomenal and physical concepts have different contents.
Our robust physical concepts are of non-categorical properties, whereas our phenomenal concepts are of
non-fundamental categorical properties. Since these properties are not identical, the Russellian
physicalist can plausibly deny premise three of Chalmers’ argument: zombie twins who possess the same
phenomenal concepts as us are not conceivable because our phenomenal concepts involve categorical
properties, and the zombies’ “phenomenal” concepts do not—not because our phenomenal concepts
involve anything nonphysical.
This is similar to the answer that nonphysicalists give. However, because Russellian physicalists
expand the number of physically-acceptable ontological categories, the move is warranted for them
without making phenomenal concepts at all nonphysical. As I discussed in section one, the Russellian
physicalist must assert that we cannot conceive of zombie worlds that are true minimal physical
duplicates of our world. We instead are conceiving of minimal non-categorical duplicates, which lack
categorical properties. Zombies conceived of in this way do not have access to the same properties that
we have access to in subjective experience.
Chalmers’ master argument presents a decisive reason to prefer Russellian physicalism over the
phenomenal concept strategy. As I said, though, there may be a way for a phenomenal concept strategist
to resist the noxious conclusion of Chalmers’ argument. Even if this is so, there is an additional reason
Russellian physicalism is superior to the phenomenal concept strategy: Russellian physicalism is not an
error theory, and the phenomenal concept strategy is.
To see why the phenomenal concept strategy is an error theory, suppose that phenomenal
properties are identical to non-categorical neural properties. Can we scientifically explain these neural
properties? I strongly suspect that we can: they are explained by lower-level biological, chemical, atomic
and subatomic properties. Can we make correct inferences about these neural properties? Again, I see
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Russellian physicalism is neutral between which specific account of phenomenal concepts is correct.
However, probably something like Papineau’s (2002) quotationalism is the most appropriate candidate,
since this allows phenomenal concepts to involve categorical phenomenal properties as constituents.

81

no reason why not: just as we can infer properties of complex non-mental systems from lower-level
properties, we ought to be able to infer properties of the brain from the properties of the brain’s parts.
Under the assumption that phenomenal properties are neural properties, we are fully capable of inferring
and explaining everything relevant about consciousness via a scientific method; nonetheless, we feel that
that these are incorrect inferences and insufficient explanations. The phenomenal concept strategy
merely offers an explanation to account for our mistaken judgements about these explanations and
inferences.
Under the phenomenal concept strategy, Mary does know everything there is to be known about
the phenomenology of redness while still in the room! All that the phenomenal concept strategy adds is
an explanation for why it seems to her that she learns about a new property when she leaves the room.39
It is an account of her error. Likewise, we think zombie worlds are possible, but we are wrong. The
phenomenal concept strategy accounts for this error as well.
In my eyes, any such error theory is far too deflationary about the status of our phenomenal
judgements. If the phenomenal concept strategy is right, then consciousness looks weird to us, but only
because we have a silly bit of cognitive machinery that prevents us from seeing how phenomenal and
physical concepts can both refer to a single thing. If our concepts were better behaved, then the mystery
of consciousness would dissolve, since we would be able to recognize that phenomenal properties are
identical to neural (or functional, or representational, or informational) properties. To put the same point
more emphatically: the phenomenal concept strategy fails to account for Mary’s tears of joy and wonder
when she sees red for the first time.40

39

A phenomenal concept strategist might object, and say that there is a sense in which Mary does learn
a new fact when she sees red: she learns about a different mode of presentation. To borrow an example
from David Papineau (forthcoming), this is similar to a case in which someone knows that Cary Grant is
from Bristol, but doesn’t know that Cary Grant is identical to Archie Leach. When she finds out that Archie
Leach is from Bristol, it seems that she learns a new fact, even though the two propositions have identical
wide-scope content. As I see it, this sort of response does not diminish my charge that the phenomenal
concept strategy is an error theory: if the phenomenal concept strategy is right, then perhaps Mary may
learn some sort of fact when she leaves the room, but not the fact that she thinks she learns. It does not
seem to her that she learns about a new conceptual mode of presentation for an already-known fact—
rather, she thinks she learns about a mental property that was previously unknown to her.
40 There is a puzzle about phenomenal judgements lurking here for Russellian physicalists: what
accounts for the tears of wonder and joy of Mary’s zombie twin? Though she has no feeling, and her
emotions are thus ersatz wonder and ersatz joy, it nonetheless is the case that the non-categorical
properties of zombie Mary are sufficient to account for her phenomenal judgements (see Chalmers
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Compared to Russellian physicalism, the strangeness of consciousness is not sufficiently
respected. Phenomenal concept strategists come closer than traditional reductive physicalists to properly
accounting for consciousness’ strangeness, but are off the mark. Conversely, Russellian physicalists
need not offer an error theory: we are not wrong when we judge that non-categorical properties fail to
explain consciousness, or that we cannot infer phenomenal properties from non-categorical properties, or
that zombies are (in some sense) possible. This provides a good reason to prefer Russellian physicalism
over the phenomenal concept strategy: error theories should be avoided if they can be!
4. Conclusion
I have argued that, of all the available accounts of consciousness, Russellian physicalism is the most
plausible contender. Nonphysicalism violates our Copernican attitudes, whereas traditional reductive
physicalism fails to account for the strangeness of consciousness whatsoever. Mysterianism is too
mysterious, and the phenomenal concept strategy is too deflationary. Only Russellian physicalism is in
the sweet spot, providing a theoretical account of consciousness and its place in nature, without saying
we are in error when we judge that scientific explanations fail to account for consciousness, and without
making consciousness fundamental. Moreover, it offers plausible answers to all the standard antiphysicalist challenges, including an answer to Chalmers’ master argument against the phenomenal
concept strategy.
However, even if it one is unconvinced that Russellian physicalism is the best view on
consciousness of all those available, it should be acknowledged that Russellian physicalism nonetheless
constitutes significant progress on the mind-body problem. This is because the standard arguments for
nonphysicalism are equally arguments for Russellian physicalism. This means that there are no longer
any good reasons to be a nonphysicalist: all such reasons are neutral between nonphysicalism and
Russellian physicalism. I suspect that there are Copernican philosophers who would like to be
physicalists, and not posit human-defining properties at the bottom level of nature, but have come to see
physicalism as hopeless due to the arguments of Chalmers, Jackson and company. Now there is no

forthcoming). Why aren’t non-categorical properties also sufficient to account for non-zombie Mary’s
phenomenal judgements? I don’t claim to have the solution to this puzzle, but Alter and Coleman’s (in
preparation) work on mental causation under Russellian monism may help: Mary’s phenomenal
judgements are caused by phenomenology, and zombie Mary’s judgements are caused by noncategorical properties only. Different ultimate causal explanations must be given for these two worlds.
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barrier for philosophers of this stripe to stop worrying about nonphysicalism, and they can restrict
philosophical debate to the relative merits of competing physicalist accounts of consciousness.
There is one caveat: though Russellian physicalism is a version of physicalism in the via negativa
sense, it is not a version of physicalism in the theory-based sense. This is because Russellian
physicalism requires positing categorical properties which are in principle outside the scope of any
possible human science. This means that Russellian physicalism, which is a quite attractive view on the
nature of consciousness, cannot be adopted by physicalists who tie ‘physical’ to physics. It thus gives up
on what I referred to as “scientific imperialism”—the hope that all of nature is in principle discernible by
human science. This is the cost of answering anti-physicalist arguments in a way that a nonphysicalist
would find acceptable.
Physicalists who would like to use the view developed in this paper to defeat anti-physicalist
arguments are thus constrained to via negativa physicalism, with the attendant existential consequences
that I identified in the previous section of this dissertation. This is because Russellian physicalism makes
mentality categorical and scientifically inscrutable, but not fundamental. As a result, robust free will is
impossible, as well as a straightforward version of an immortal soul (though a quasi-soul is still possible).
However, since Russellian physicalism is only explicitly concerned with human mentality, it is a bit weaker
than full-blooded via negativa physicalism: for all we know, there is a God who is a fundamentally mental
being, and there are fundamental normative properties.
This means that one could accept Russellian physicalism without being a complete via negativa
physicalist. However, the very reasons that motivate adopting Russellian physicalism also constitute
reasons to accept a complete version of via negativa: Copernicanism should lead us to reject not only
fundamental mental properties, but fundamental normative properties as well. The existence of such
fundamental normative properties puts morality—an especially human-seeming phenomenon—at the
bottom level of nature. It also seems that the existence of a fundamentally mental God would violate our
Copernican attitudes. Hence, a Russellian physicalist who is aware of the motivations for her view ought
to embrace all of via negativa physicalism, which means giving up on the possibility of ultimate purpose,
karma, and God (though, again, pseudo-karma and pseudo-God are possible).
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